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Abstract 
This thesis asks the question “How do government-initiated local referendums 
affect citizens’ perceptions of democracy?”. In the theoretical discussion, direct 
democratic theory is found to be inadequate when studying the effects of 
government-initiated referendums. Since the referendums are government-
initiated, that negates the important aspect of bypassing elites. The referendum 
democracy concept as a second theoretical view on referendums offered the 
perspective of referendums as people’s veto. However, also this concept adhered 
to the view that citizens are the main actors in a referendum process. Thus, theory 
which is more finely tuned to the power of elites was developed to study the 
effects government-initiated referendums may have on citizens. The resulting 
hypothesis (Citizens who experience local referendums will grant their local 
government increased trust and legitimacy) was tested on the Swedish case of 
local referendums. Independently pooled survey data for the years 2002-2012 was 
employed measure over time. Logistic regression revealed that no relationships 
between experiencing a government-initiated referendum and more favourable 
perceptions of democracy were statistically significant. It is suggested that this 
might depend on the very nature of the referendums. By skewing the power in 
favour of political representatives, citizens no longer feel as participants in 
shaping policy. 
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1 Introduction 
Referendums are often discussed from two democracy traditions – the direct and 
the representative. Opponents of an increased use of referendums often refer to 
that citizens do not (or cannot) make informed decisions, that referendums upsets 
political balance and ultimately do not serve any purpose in improving citizens’ 
views of government and democracy (cf. Setälä, 1999: 43-45). Advocators of 
referendums often call upon the positive effects direct democracy predicts them to 
have on citizens: Through participation in popular votes citizens are thought to be 
civically educated which makes them more responsible, tolerant and politically 
enlightened (Pateman, 1970; Kaufmann, 2005). Both traditions rest on normative 
ideas of how democracy ought to be enacted. However, they are flawed when 
conducting empirical analyses.  
While most historical studies on the referendum institute are normative, a 
growing empirical literature often relies on direct democratic theory when 
studying referendums that actually occur in representative democracy models (cf. 
Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004). The theoretical claims direct democracy makes about 
civic education are applied to referendums placed in a non-direct context. By not 
taking this important factor into account properly, the theoretical claims are 
flawed. When analysing the effects referendums have on how citizens perceive 
democracy thus have to be situated in the representative model they take place. 
This means that, with regards to how citizens perceive government and 
democracy, we cannot rely on the expectations set by direct democracy. Most 
scholars would probably agree that referendums as they are implemented today do 
not represent pure direct democracy, but there seems to be an unwillingness to 
move beyond the direct democratic theoretical framework. 
There have been tries to adjust the study of referendums to the representative 
democracy model. Mendelsohn and Parkins (2001) “referendum democracy” is 
such an attempt. They argue that referendums can function as a control 
mechanism with which citizens can threaten and correct representatives who do 
not act in the citizens’ interest. Although this model can be seen as less direct 
democratic, it is still expected that voters are empowered, and affected in the 
sense that they gain knowledge about, and feel responsible for political matters 
they vote upon. However, Mendelsohn and Parkins model only apply to citizen-
initiatives or mandatory referendums where citizens are the main actors in the 
process of requiring a popular vote. Thus, “referendum democracy” cannot be 
used to accurately study government-initiated referendums which are shaped on 
the premises of elites. It is a step in the right direction, but it still clings to the 
direct democratic thought that citizens are the main actors in a referendum – a 
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notion that is not applicable to government-initiated or government-sponsored 
referendums.  
The reason for government actors to initiate a single referendum may vary 
(Morel, 2001), but the reason for including them in the decision-making apparatus 
seem to be recurring: They are tools for increasing democracy by bridging the gap 
between representatives and citizens (Gilljam & Jodal, 2006). The referendum 
institute is used to bring citizens closer to the decision making in representative 
democracies, but since representatives seem reluctant to give away to much power 
to citizens, the government-initiated referendum becomes a solution (cf. Morel, 
2001; Rahat, 2009: 102). However, since the direct democratic and referendum 
democratic expectations on how referendums affect citizens rely on citizen 
legislation that bypasses representatives, the government-initiated popular votes 
negate the very mechanism of what gives citizens their civic education or 
empowerment. We need to rethink the impact referendums have on citizens. 
1.1 Research question 
The thesis is guided by the following research question: 
 
- How do government-initiated local referendums affect citizens’ perceptions of 
democracy? 
 
The question addresses perceptions of democracy. The direct democratic civic 
education hypothesis and the referendum democracy concept also deal with how 
citizens perceive government and democracy. However, in this thesis I propose an 
entry to the topic by focusing on what elites want citizens to experience. Based on 
that government can frame, initiate and manipulate government-initiated 
referendums, the impact referendums have on citizens can instead be found in the 
relation between political representation and citizens. It also means that we should 
be less optimistic of how referendums affect citizens’ perceptions of democracy: 
By lowering the amount of power citizens exercise and by raising that of 
government, we contradict the fundamental direct democratic elements of 
referendums. When referendums no longer are citizen-efforts to change agenda or 
policy, but an instrument government uses to further their own interest, the 
citizens’ experiences are shaped according to what participation in such a 
referendum actually means – voting on a binary choice strategically presented by 
government, with the results being interpreted and (not always) implemented by 
political representatives and bureaucracy. Therefore a theory of how referendums 
affect citizens’ perceptions of democracy needs to be further situated in the 
representative model. Since referendums are used to close a gap between 
representatives and citizens, and as a way of revitalizing representative 
democracy, possible effects on citizens’ perceptions of democracy would be in 
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how citizens think of their elected representatives. I refer to this as the 
government-initiative hypothesis: Citizens who experience local referendums will 
grant their local government increased trust and legitimacy. 
A second important part of the question is the locality. Theory of referendums, 
both direct democratic and “referendum democratic”, has been applied 
extensively to national referendums, and state-level referendums in the U.S., but 
inquiries on local-level decision making does not seem to be well established. In 
this thesis, the theoretical argument I make about the impact of government-
initiated referendums is tested on local referendums. By assessing local 
referendums, this thesis also covers a gap in the literature. The low interest in 
local referendums among direct democratic empirical research is actually 
surprising since this school of democracy was developed with small-scale polities 
in mind (such as the Athenian democracy or Rousseau’s local decision-making).  
The empirical examination of the theory is conducted on the Swedish use of 
local referendums. The Swedish case presents possibilities for drawing 
conclusions about local government-initiated referendums. With a large set of 
comparable political entities (290 municipalities) that have held referendums 
throughout the 2000’s, the case can provide insights into how citizens are affected 
by referendums. This analysis covers 63 referendums over the period 2002-2011. 
These were almost exclusively government-initiated, and the few (estimated to be 
between 8 or 10) who were citizen-initiated are still government-sponsored 
(Wallin, 2007; Kaufmann, 2011). 
Independently pooled survey data with repeated measures from the SOM 
Institute is used to assess perceptions of democracy in a pre-test – post-test design 
(cf. Vedung, 2009: 243). The data is used to cover observations in perceptions of 
democracy one year before and one year after municipal referendums for the 
whole period
1
. Thus, I am using 11 surveys with nationally representative samples 
for the years 2002-2012. 
1.1.1 Purpose 
This thesis has ambitions for explaining the effects of government-initiated 
referendums generally, but it also contends to shed light on the Swedish use of 
local referendums. Thus, this thesis has two aims, whereas the first is to promote a 
theoretical analysis of the how government-initiated referendums affect citizens, 
where the theory is more finely tuned to the lack of citizen control and power. In 
this thesis I also aim to explain how the Swedish use of local referendums has 
affected citizens. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1
 Except for the referendums of 2002, where the pre-referendum observation is made the same 
year as the referendum. See discussion under 3.3.1 Observing referendums in survey data. 
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While the use of local referendums in Sweden is the case which is used to test 
the theoretical argument, this thesis also has an ambition to evaluate the use of 
local referendums.  Thus, by developing a theoretical argument for government-
initiated referendums and testing it empirically, I make a contribution to the 
academic literature. With the empirical evidence from evaluating the Swedish 
case, this thesis also has properties that can contribute to the societal debate on the 
desired effects of referendums in general. Furthermore, analysing the impact of 
referendums with quantitative methods, a large set of referendums and over a long 
period of time, has to my knowledge not been done previously. With this 
approach to a case study I can find previously unexplored evidence.  
Since this paper does not aim to evaluate individual referendums, there is no 
need to acknowledge the immediate goals and the reasons for holding a single 
referendum in single municipality. Such immediate goals, to name two discussed 
in the literature, could be fractured parties or alliances needing a nonpartisan 
decision (De Vreese, 2006) or a minority advocating a populist agenda (cf. 
Gerber, 1999). Instead, the question and purpose of this paper address the 
overarching perspectives for why referendums should be used at all – the 
democratic reasons for including referendums as a way of decision making in an 
otherwise representative government. 
1.1.2 Terminology 
In this thesis some terminology is recurring. Some definitional notes are here 
given beforehand. Perceptions of democracy, the dependent variable, is 
conditional upon theoretical arguments and is therefore defined later in the 
introduction to section 2 Theory. 
 
- Referendum 
A referendum is in this paper defined in its most generic sense as a popular 
consultation where all individuals who are eligible to vote have the right to 
participate (cf Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001: 22; cf. Wallin, 2007: 58). However, 
throughout this thesis I frequently refer to specific institutions such as 
government-initiated referendum or citizen-initiatives which have more specified 
conditions. 
 
 
- Government-initiated referendum 
The government-initiated referendum is a referendum which is held due to a 
political decision by a governing assembly. In this thesis local parliaments 
(municipal assemblies) decide upon such matters. Referendums that are initiated 
by government are in the literature sometimes described as institutionally 
initiated. Possibly, this could be interpreted to have a broader meaning. For 
conceptual clarity, “government-initiated” is used throughout the text.  
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- Citizen initiative 
The citizen initiative is separate from other referendums in that it is initiated by 
citizens. Usually, a share of the population signs a petition which government then 
has to administer to a popular vote. Depending on legislation, such initiatives can 
bring new proposals to the agenda, or they can reject or approve of already 
existing proposals or legislation.  
 
- Municipal assembly – municipal board 
Municipal assembly (kommunfullmäktige) denotes the local parliaments of 
Swedish municipalities. Municipal board (kommunstyrelse) denotes the local 
executive governments of Swedish municipalities. Unlike national government, 
municipal boards also include representatives from the opposition. 
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2  Theory 
In this chapter I will discuss why the study of referendums needs to move past the 
dichotomy of direct- and representative democracy. While advocates of direct 
democracy argue that an increased use of referendums would be collective self-
government and work as civic education for the citizens, advocates of 
representative democracy criticise the instability referendums lead to, which could 
hardly have any positive effects on citizens. Referendums are occasionally studied 
as elements of direct democracy in an otherwise representative model (see for 
example Bowler & Donovan, 2004; Frey et al, 2001). Although this could be seen 
as moving towards another theoretical framework, this view still refers to 
referendums as direct democracy. 
This leads us to expect that with an increased use of referendums, some of the 
positive outcomes direct democracy hopes for will come true – for example, 
referendums could vitalize other channels of democratic participation and increase 
the responsiveness of elected politicians. 
My argument is that we cannot study the effects of referendums as elements of 
direct democracy when the referendums are not actually used in the purpose of 
self-government or strengthening the power of citizens. Instead, I promote an 
altered version of Mendehlson and Parkins’ (2001) “referendum democracy”, 
where the referendums are used as a tool for bridging a widening gap between 
representatives and citizens. The effects we can expect of referendums are 
therefore tied to the relation between representatives/elites and citizens. They can 
be observed in citizens’ attitudes towards government – here conceptualised as 
perceptions of democracy.  
“Perceptions of democracy” is not a concept tied only to the effects of 
government-initiated referendums. In this study, perceptions of democracy 
constitute citizens’ opinions and beliefs of their political environment. As 
discussed above, when studying how government-initiated referendums affect 
citizens, it can be narrowed down to citizens opinions of their representatives.  
 For government-initiated local referendums, the focus on 
representatives/elites is of great importance. Since the votes are held by 
government, to strengthen government, these are the two dimensions in which 
referendums actually may affect how citizens perceive their local democracy. In 
the final section I construct a hypothesis, which I call the government-initiative 
hypothesis, from the democratic reasons for why government-initiated 
referendums are used: Citizens who experience local referendums will grant their 
local government increased trust and legitimacy. Here, trust and legitimacy are 
considered as parts and indicators of the overarching “perceptions of democracy”. 
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The theoretical support for this hypothesis is that by being invited to participate in 
shaping policy, citizens feel that they are “being listened to” and therefore are 
more positive in how they perceive the local democracy. 
In section 2.2, the direct democratic, normative, perspectives on referendums 
are described. In section 2.3, the relation between representative democracy and 
referendums is discussed from the referendum democracy theory/concept. Lastly, 
with focus on the relation between representatives and citizens, I present an 
altered version of the referendum democracy concept which is tuned more finely 
to the power of elites in the government-initiated referendum institute.  
2.1 Direct democracy and referendums 
When studying referendums it is necessary to anchor the institution in its historic 
tradition. Previous comments of the normative perspectives of referendums stem 
from the two traditions direct democracy and the representative democracy 
(Gilljam & Hermansson, 2003). Other similar concepts that capture this 
distinction exist, such as Lewin’s elite- or participation democracy (1970: 17-20). 
While attempts have been made to break this polarized image of democratic 
government by including more categories and by adapting them to specific 
countries, the two traditions of democracy are still the main source of analysis 
when discussing democratic government (cf. Wallin, 2007). In this text I will 
focus on the direct democratic tradition, since it is from this tradition most 
theorizing on the effects referendums may have on citizens perceptions of 
democracy originate.  
The literature on referendums is historically largely descriptive or normative 
(Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004: 463). This may very well be because of the close ties 
between direct democracy as the ideal state and referendums as its practical 
implementation. Indeed, to some extent it is fair to say that holding referendums is 
synonymous with increasing direct democratic ideas and values (Dahl, 1998: 93, 
105-108). While other direct democratic tools can be used, such as enhancing user 
and stakeholder influence in a policy process, the referendum is considered as the 
most pure expression of the will of the people (Jungar, 2007: 14-15). Therefore, 
the values from the direct democratic tradition form the way we think about 
referendums. Through Rousseau and three modern direct democracy theorists, 
Pateman (1970), Barber (2003) and Kaufmann (2005; 1996), we can divine the 
characteristics of referendums from the direct democratic point of view. 
With this overview key concepts, which are necessary for studying 
referendums, are identified. These concepts still guides the discussion on 
participatory government and decision making through popular votes.  
First, it is necessary to pin down the aims of direct democracy, what the 
ambitions are, why it is desirable. While some of the desired outcomes of direct 
government may seem abstract, they relate very clearly to citizenship and what 
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the act of participation would bring for citizens. Here it is customary to start with 
the Athenian democracy. It is clear that the city state Athens differed from other 
contemporary and later polities in how they regarded the population as citizens, as 
opposed to subjects. Such a distinction gives rise to serious consequences 
regarding what the citizen ought to do – responsibilities and privileges. 
The political power was in essence based on a rotating mandate between 
citizens who were randomly selected. By participating in the deliberation and 
voting on public matters, the Athenians were exercising a popular rule which has 
yet to be reproduced. While the democracy in Athens suffered from several flaws, 
making it seriously un-democratic
2
, it has spawned the concept of self-
government. This is a central concept that still holds great value for the 
participatory tradition(s) (Dahl, 1989: 100). Collective/popular self-government 
even appears in definitions of democracy in contemporary political science 
literature (e.g. Setälä, 2009: 1) 
A sentiment similar to self-government is later revitalized in Rousseau’s 
general will (Setälä, 1999: 35-40). The general will is not the individual’s right to 
govern oneself, but a more collective and deliberative process of government, 
where people make decisions based on the common good. Still, it bears 
resemblance to the greek participatory ideal. Although no literature suggests that 
the citizens of Athens chose active participation over representation, the discord 
between the direct and representative traditions become evident when examining 
Rousseau’s thoughts on the matter. When discussing referendums, the general will 
can be described as a collective opinion on public matters, which takes form from 
the preferences of individuals (cf. Riley, 1970: 92-93). 
 This often quoted passage in Of the Social Contract illustrates how the 
general will, as opposed to the distorted representation, is believed by Rousseau to 
create a better output on citizens lives:  
 
When we see among the happiest people in the world bands of peasants 
regulating the affairs of state under an oak tree, and always acting wisely, can 
we help feeling a certain contempt for the refinements of other nations, which 
employ so much skill and effort to make themselves at once illustrious and 
wretched? (Rousseau, 1762, paragraph 1-2) 
 
The normative theory of direct democracy of today bears resemblance to both the 
ancient Greek practices and to Rousseau’s general will. Collective self-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2
 E.g. regarding the very restrictive citizenship policy, where a majority of the population was 
regarded as non-citizens. The attendance and participation was also very low, making it less direct 
democratic than it is usually attributed. (Wallin, 2007: 15-19) 
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government and participation can still be described as virtues that have positive 
effects on citizens. For example Kaufmann (2005: 78) argues that direct 
democracy (implemented by referendums) promotes economic growth, a 
strengthened civil society and therefore also makes people happier. This is chain 
argument resembles what other theorists discuss as self-fulfilment. Through active 
participation in the governance of oneself, citizens feel better than when decisions 
are made over their heads (cf. Barber, 2003; Pateman, 1970; Walsh, 2007). In this 
thesis I will consider the “self-fulfilment hypothesis” as a part of the civic 
education hypothesis – the desired outcome of direct democracy, which is more 
clearly stated in empirical research (Mendelsohn & Cutler, 2000).  
Participating in democratic activities is an educational effort which fosters 
enlightened and tolerant citizens. This is not just increasing the citizen’s 
knowledge of political matters, but creates an environment of truly collective 
decision making (Pateman, 1970: 42-43; cf. Adman, 2003: 142-148). This civic 
education hypothesis puts the act of collective participation in focus, as Barber 
notes: 
 
The need for politics arises when some action of public consequence becomes 
necessary and when men must thus make a public choice that is reasonable in 
the face of conflict despite the absence of an independent ground of 
judgement (Barber, 2003: 122) 
 
Participation in this sense, which share similarities with Dewey’s vision of 
American democracy (Whipple, 200: 161), is focused solely on the 
responsibilities and action of citizens. This view of democracy is very far 
removed from the representative democracy that, according to Manin (1997), is 
shaped by elites. This does not mean that direct democratic theory is false or 
undesired. However, it means that direct democracy cannot be observed in any 
contemporary democracy
3
. Therefore, direct democracy and civic education does 
not apply well when studying government-initiated referendums and their effects 
on citizens. First of all, referendums do not occur at a rate that would motivate 
civic education. Secondly, participation in referendums where question, 
alternatives on the ballot and whether the results are followed or not, does not 
correspond to direct democratic theory. Furthermore, the deliberation, both 
between citizens and in terms of media coverage, which would have to precede 
the actual vote, is not as established as it would need to be – especially with 
regards to the Swedish case (cf. Wallin, 2007: 213-216). It should here be noted 
that Barber or Pateman probably would not regard the government-initiated 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 Even Switzerland is only defined as a ”semi-direct democracy” (Kobach, 1994) 
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referendums studied in this paper as direct democratic
4
. Still, the study of 
referendums is centred on this democracy tradition (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001: 
4; Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004: 464-465 ). 
2.1.1 Referendums as the implementation of direct democracy 
How do referendums today fit into the discussion of direct democracy above? 
Specifically, how can direct democracy be efficiently organized? Some 
complications arise when answering this question in 21
st
 century democracies. 
The one problem that is always debated is the scale problem (cf. Parkinson, 2003). 
If it is no longer possible for citizens to meet in a single place and together decide 
upon matters, other arrangements have to be made. To tackle that problem 
representative democracy has a very favourable position: By electing 
representatives and giving them the rights to make decisions it is possible to 
democratically manage very large entities. Contract philosophy, which Rousseau 
draws upon, has the similar notion of pooling the freedoms of citizens to the state. 
Direct democracy has had to deliver a response to this problem, and referendums 
have become the solution. 
Letting the electorate vote in referendums is practicing direct democracy 
(Amnå, 2003: 121-124).  When keeping politics as an amateur activity it is 
imperative to bypass professional legislators, which the referendum institute allow 
for (ibid: 106-107). Although institutions that implement the decisions have to 
exist, these institutions should not hold the power to alter the decision made by 
citizens. This is a crucial point for the direct democratic view of the referendum 
institute. If it is to have the desired educative effects on citizens, it has to resemble 
collective self-government as closely as possible. This does not allow for post-
voting changes made by politicians. 
The practice of government-initiated referendums violates all the above 
described conditions for referendums to be direct democratic. Since government 
decides upon agenda, the choices on the ballot and how to frame the issue, we 
cannot regard them as direct democratic. Furthermore, government-initiated 
referendums are often advisory (Setälä, 2006: 711), and those of Sweden are 
always advisory, which means that even if citizens makes a decision that would 
incidentally mirror a general will, elected representatives may manipulate it to 
suite their own goals. It should here be noted that this practice of post-election 
changes in how a decision made by popular vote should be implemented also 
exists in polities where the referendums actually are binding (Gerber, 2004). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4
 As a matter of fact, Barber (2003: 284-287) gives practical advices for how a referendum process 
should be structured. Through mandatory media coverage of the issue, and multi-choice format of 
the ballot, citizens would get the proper civic education. 
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Direct democracy does not necessarily exclude a representative mechanism, 
representation can be an efficient way of solving the scale-problem; however, 
representation in this sense bears little resemblance to the competitive election 
democracies favoured in contemporary nation states. Yet again, Rousseau can be 
consulted for a view on how representation ought to work to best facilitate the 
general will: The representative assembly would serve as a forum where opinions 
and attitudes confront each other, not in a one-way communication but in a 
constructive discussion (Setälä, 1999: 42-45). Moreover, the representatives 
should not be bound to a certain interest group, such as a party, but should instead 
look to the electorate they represent for opinions and standpoints on issues. Still, 
as discussed earlier, the ideal direct democratic way of government would not be 
legislation by intermediating discussants, but by the electorate themselves. A 
representative assembly as contemplated by Rousseau is thus still a compromise, 
or rather a necessary evil, to solve the scale problem in larger political entities. 
Another solution is the Athenian one, were legislators were chosen randomly 
(Setälä, 1999: 44).  
The need for a solution to the impracticality of direct democracy has spawned 
a number of institutions advocated by direct democrats. All of them can in some 
way be tied to the referendum as the implementing practice. The citizen initiative, 
recall, and veto on constitutional amendments are examples in how this can be 
institutionally arranged (Gilljam, 2003). While the need for, and motivation 
behind, these institutions differ, they are all executed by a popular vote. The 
referendum has become the most efficient way to solve the scale problem, either 
traditionally at the ballot or by the later postal and electronic voting (for a 
Swedish example see SOU 1999:12). Indeed, the referendum allows for deciding 
upon a clearly defined issue without “tainting” the pure will of the people.  
Other political tools that could be considered as, at least partly, direct 
democratic are increased stakeholder and user focus in governance. Examples of 
this on local level decision making is youth councils, hearings of politicians, 
citizen dialogue projects etc. While it is unclear whether such projects should be 
regarded as expressions of direct democracy, advocates often call upon the virtues 
of direct democracy. Whereas one aspect is the legitimizing function, say, 
consulting a youth council may have on where to place a youth centre, the other is 
how the act of participation affects the citizen (Montin, 1998). 
In conclusion, in a direct democratic ideal type it is expected that citizens gain 
civic education through participation in referendums. From the responsibilities of 
making decisions for themselves and others, citizens become more tolerant, open 
and gain political knowledge. A second desired outcome, which goes hand in 
hand with civic education, is self-fulfilment. Although I would not separate the 
two, the self-fulfilment indicates that participating in politics and self-government 
is not only good governance which makes people into more virtuous citizens, it 
heightens the quality of life as well (Kaufmann, 2005; Pateman, 1970). However, 
as noted earlier, this sort of theory is not applicable to government-initiated 
referendums, and rarely any other type of referendum (Gerber, 2004; cf. Kissane, 
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2009). In order to study the effects government-initiated we have to move beyond 
the ideal type that direct democracy represents.  
2.2 Referendum democracy and representation 
In the previous section referendums were discussed as “practicing direct 
democracy”. The institute effectively solves the scale-problem and the problem of 
mediating elites. While both may be true this is not really how referendums have 
been used in modern liberal democracies (Ranney & Butler, 1994: 2-3; Jungar, 
2007: 81-89). As Qvortup notes regarding the motives for implementing 
referendums in the U.S.:  
 
The referendum was not linked to the ideals of ancient Athens, the New 
England town meetings, the Swiss Landesgemeinden or radical theories of 
participatory democracy [...] (Qvortrup, 2005: 12). 
 
As an example, we can look to California where different varieties of state-level 
referendums exist mainly as checks-and-balances which can hold politicians 
accountable. In the usual separation of powers scenario, the three branches of 
government which control each other are the legislative, judiciary and executive 
(Qvortrup, 2005: 15). Here we could almost see the citizen-initiated referendum 
as a fourth branch which limits the powers of the legislative branch. The 
referendums some European countries are obliged to hold when amending their 
constitution works from a similar logic: Limiting the power of elected politicians, 
and reminding them of the electorate’s preferences. (ibid). 
Making use of referendums as an extension of the separation of powers does 
not share the aims of direct democracy as described earlier. If one argues that 
referendums are a means to defining the general will, and another argue that they 
serve as a controlling mechanism on representatives – does this merit the same 
effects referendums have on citizens’ perception of democracy? Furthermore, can 
government-initiated referendums (such as in Swedish municipalities) even 
qualify as a control of the representatives, when representatives are the ones 
dictating the problem, the possible solutions and if the results should be 
implemented?  
If we conclude that referendums as they occur in contemporary liberal 
democracies do not share the aims of those visualized by direct democrats, then 
they should not be studied as such. It could here be argued that just because 
referendums of today do not live up to all direct democratic ideals, that does not 
infer that they do not capture the essence of direct democracy – much like how 
representative assemblies (parliaments) have never been truly representative of its 
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electorate, but still catches the essence of representation (cf. Setälä, 1999: 45-46). 
Still, having differing democratic reasons for why referendums are used, and then 
formulating them in accordance, does affect the effects they have on citizens’ 
perceptions of democracy.   
The focal point which separates the government-initiated referendums and the 
separation of powers-referendums from the direct democratic traditions is the 
view on elites. While the two former actually promote the interaction between 
elites and citizens the direct democratic tradition would see referendums as the 
opposite; a way to negate the powers of elites. 
Even if we contend that the usages of referendums fulfil some direct 
democratic criteria, they lack the important aspects of bypassing representatives. 
Categorizing referendums as tools for increased direct democracy is misleading. 
Only if direct democracy as a concept is redefined to a minimal standard of 
“citizen influence” can such a stance be adequate when studying effects of 
referendums. Similarly, studying referendums from the representative democracy 
tradition, where they are seen as only hindrances for stability and as undermining 
the capacity of ruling, provides no better possibilities of explaining how decision 
making through popular votes affect citizens (cf. Setälä, 1999: 48). 
The perspective of direct democracy, or Schumpeterian representative 
democracy for that matter, does not provide useful analytical tools for studying 
how citizens perceive democracy after experiencing a referendum – especially not 
government-initiated referendums. Measuring the effects of government-initiated 
referendums in the desired outcomes of direct democracy could result in a false 
rejection of participatory democracy theory, but it also constitutes a blunt 
analytical tool for this paper (cf. Qvortrup, 2005: 12).  Conceptualizing 
referendums in a representative democracy by other means than a dichotomous 
scale is needed.
5
  
Taking the direct democracy out of referendums is not a new thought. For 
example, in 2001 Mendelsohn and Parkin (2001: 1-5) argued that even though 
referendums may be an invention of direct democracy, the institute has become as 
much a part of representative democracy as any other way of shaping public 
policy. Their solution is one “democracy system”, instead of two competing 
(direct – representative), which they call referendum democracy. The closest to a 
definition presented by them is: 
 
[...] referendum democracy – a system in which the use, possible use, and 
threatened use of the referendum are fully integrated into the decision-making 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5
 It should be noted that Swedish research on the matter usually contends that referendums, and 
other institutes dubbed as “democracy projects”, are direct democratic elements in an otherwise 
representative democracy (see for example Gilljam & Jodal, 2006).  
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apparatus of representative, liberal democracy (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001: 
1-2) 
This new conceptualization is presented in the introduction to an anthology of 
how national referendums have impacted core institutions in liberal democracies. 
Thus, the authors do not really delve into how the causal mechanisms in such a 
theoretical direction would look in closer examination. However, Mendelsohn and 
Parkins discussion actualises two dimensions of referendums that may further our 
understanding of their function in an otherwise representative democracy – (1) the 
role of mediating elites and (2) the reason for holding referendums. 
Regarding (1) mediating elites, it is of great importance to note that the results 
of referendums, even if they are binding, always have to pass through elites. In a 
study of citizen initiated referendums in American states Gerber et al. (2004: 4) 
challenge the view that “[...] victory at the polls implies direct and substantial 
policy change”, something they argue to be false depending on which type of 
policy is voted on. One of the reasons for that result is that actors (organizations 
or networks) who press for a referendum often disperse after election day, while 
elites (legislative and bureaucratic) stay organised afterwards, making it hard for 
citizens to evaluate whether the implementation of the referendum results were 
followed, altered or simply ignored (ibid: 20). The most important conclusion 
from this study, along with an earlier publication on the matter (Gerber et al, 
2001), is that the results of a referendum always have to pass through the 
interference of elected officials as well as a non-political bureaucracy. Even if the 
results of a referendum are followed by both legislative and bureaucratic officials, 
this severely limits the directness of referendums. Furthermore, these studies 
analyzed citizen initiatives, some of them binding. When compared to advisory 
government-initiated referendums, the binding citizen-initiatives are more 
resembling of direct democracy. 
The second dimension, the reason for holding referendums, has a profound 
impact on why referendums cannot be analyzed as direct democracy. The 
immediate reasons for deciding on policy by popular vote surely differ a lot 
between states and even more between separate cases. However, when discussing 
the motivation for holding referendums as such, a pattern emerges. In normative 
theory on direct democracy the two reasons for holding referendums were that it 
was a way to capture the pure popular/general will and civic education. However, 
the actual reasons for holding referendums seems to stray from this path 
substantially. In her review of normative theories of referendums Maija Setälä 
(1999: 43-47) concludes that the reasons for holding referendums may vary 
depending on how representation is viewed. The two representative ideals Setälä 
identifies are the microcosm/delegate and trustee/independence models. In the 
former, representative assemblies are thought to portrait their electorate, a view 
which was previously mentioned. The latter is derived from theorists as 
Schumpeter and, to some extent, Burke, who argues that representatives should be 
able to make decision based on their own, better judgement (Wallin, 2007: 26). 
 15 
 
Following this distinction of representative ideals, referendums are, at least in 
theory, motivated differently. In the trustee/independence model, referendums are 
hardly necessary at all. First, it is very unlikely that people actually have a “will” 
in most cases and second, if a will does exist, it is probably undesirable to bind the 
legislative assembly to it (Setälä, 1999: 47). With the delegate/microcosm model, 
where citizens delegate sovereignty and decision making to representatives 
mirroring their opinions, it is easier to motivate the use of referendums. In this 
ideal Setälä discerns a basic principle-agent problem where the honest principle is 
the people and the, sometimes dishonest, agents are the elected politicians. The 
principle can hold their agents accountable through general elections, however, 
referendums may here constitute another correctional mechanism where voters 
may rebuke unfavoured policies (Setälä, 1999: 46).  
The principle-agent argument for referendums resembles another theoretical 
direction taken by A.V. Dicey. Dicey’s normative theory, by Qvortrup (2005: 42-
53) cited as the only theory dealing solely with referendums, dictates that the 
referendum institute is “the people’s veto”. Dicey introduced referendums as a 
check on party tyranny in late 19
th
 century Britain. He argued that a political party 
could obtain a parliamentary majority which did not match its actual power, thus 
creating a situation where changes in the constitution could be made without the 
electorates consent (ibid: 48). In regular policy decisions this was not a problem. 
However, when irrevocable constitutional changes were made, they should be 
sufficiently anchored in the electorate’s opinions6 (ibid). This theory captures the 
constitutional referendums, and those of California and Switzerland, very well. 
For example, in his study of Swiss national referendums, Papadopoulos (2007) 
finds empirical support for the argument that if popular votes are used as a 
controlling mechanism, where the people are regarded as a veto-player, this 
increases the responsiveness of elected representatives. 
However, when studying the effects of government-initiated referendums it 
could not be justified to see the citizens as the ones who correct or control the 
representatives. Therefore, the referendum democracy concept opens for a more 
nuanced explanation of what referendums are and how they affect citizens’ 
perceptions of democracy, but it lacks explanations when moving to a context 
where institutions favour the elites. When studying government-initiated 
referendums, I thus have to further adapt the expected effects on citizens’ 
perceptions of democracy to representative democracy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 According to Qvortrup, Dicey expresses a belief in between the two models of representation that 
were mentioned earlier: “Parliament may be wiser than the citizens who elect it” and “Parliament 
which does not represent  its electors is not an assembly which illustrates the benefits of a 
representative system” (Dicey quoted in Qvortrup, 2005: 52) 
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2.3 Government-initiated referendums and citizens 
In this section I will present theory on how local referendums affect citizens’ 
perceptions of democracy based on the referendum democracy concept, but 
revised and adjusted to government-initiated referendums. I propose that 
government-initiated referendums cannot have the effects presented by the 
normative direct democratic tradition, nor can they empower citizens as 
referendum democracy explains. If government-initiated referendums have any 
effects on citizens, it would instead be in relation to the representatives who 
initiate the referendum. In this section I will also turn to case specific material, 
such as national government reports and legislation. Although this may impede 
the possibilities to generalize the findings of this study, the losses in validity of 
not taking contextual factors into consideration would be more severe. 
If we conclude that referendums are not an expression of direct democracy, 
but also admit that they are not a built in part of representative democracy, how 
should we then approach the study of their effects on citizens? The referendum 
democracy concept, and the subsequent discussion on representation, presents an 
alternative conceptualization. However, the assumptions that “the use, possible 
use, and threatened use of the referendum are fully integrated into the decision-
making apparatus” (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001: 1-2) do not correspond to the 
institutional setting of government-initiated referendums. If government actors (in 
the Swedish case, municipal boards and municipal assemblies) have a monopoly 
on initiating referendums then the “possible use, and threatened use” of such 
popular votes is severely limited. If we look to Swedish legal regulations before 
the constitutional amendment of 2010, it was impossible for citizen initiatives to 
successfully be put to a popular vote without the support of a majority in the local 
parliament (SFS: 1994). Such institutions make studying government-initiated 
referendums as “people’s veto” irrelevant. 
The concept of referendum democracy could be seen as a step in the right 
direction – by adapting referendums to the context of representative democracy it 
can explain how binding citizen-initiatives and mandatory referendums work (cf. 
Mendelsohn & Parkins, 2001: 19). It also provides suitable ways of studying the 
effects these referendums have on citizens, such as empowerment in relation to 
elected representatives. As noted earlier, however, they only apply to a 
“referendum democratic model” where citizens are the focal point around which 
referendums are organised. This constitutes a flaw when conducting empirical 
analysis on states that minimize the citizen influence over the referendum process, 
except for in the actual vote. Therefore, when studying government-initiated local 
referendums we must yet again look to why they are used. 
A graphical representation of the differences between the referendum 
democracy concept and the government-initiated referendums studied here can be 
found in figure 2.3.1. 
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Figure 2.3.1: Two models of referendums in contemporary representative states 
2.3.1 Why use referendums 
In the discussion on referendum democracy and the people’s veto, some general 
reasons for using referendums to decide on public policy are given. Following that 
discussion we can view referendums as a mechanism that corrects elected 
politicians when they deviate from the path voters put them on. However, what 
are the reasons for government-initiated referendums and for Swedish 
municipalities? If we look to the committee of local democracy’s review 
(1993:90) an increased use of referendums locally were deemed desired, however, 
the reason for this was not necessarily to increase the power of citizens, but to 
“strengthen the positions of elected and parties” (Wallin, 2007: 82). The resulting 
law in 1994 saw an introduction of the citizen initiative. If five percent of the 
electorate signed a petition, local parliament had to vote on whether to hold a 
referendum or not. Most such initiatives failed since a majority of the elected had 
to vote in favour of a referendum (Wallin, 2007: 85). Thus, even the citizen-
initiated votes have to be sponsored by local government. 
Seven years later, in SOU 2000:1 “A sustainable democracy!” (En uthållig 
demokrati!), the focus on direct democracy was very clear. The overarching 
perspective of the report was in favour of “a participatory democracy with 
deliberative qualities” (author’s translation) (SOU 2000:1, p. 23). The report 
concluded that even though the representative values are irreplaceable, and 
although the conflict between direct and representative democracy is substantial, 
the state should pursue more ways of democratic influence outside of the 
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representative arena. In the long run, this would result in a more legitimate 
representation (SOU, 2000:1, p. 245). While both reports, and the one of 2000 in 
particular, argued in favour of increased direct-democratic governance, they also 
stay confined to the frames of representative democracy. Along with reports from 
the SNS Democracy Council (Esaiasson & Rothstein, 1995; Petersson 1998; 
Petersson, 2000) it is possible to discern a view that while Swedish democracy in 
large works good, it suffers from a participatory deficit, which may affect the 
legitimacy of the current democratic system. Government-initiated referendums 
here become a way to bridge this gap between the electorate and the elected. 
 I would say that this constitutes a different understanding of the usage of 
referendums compared to direct democratic and referendum democratic theory. 
When national government argues that an increased use of local referendums will 
strengthen elected representatives, and bridge the gap between political 
representatives and their citizens, it is not direct democracy. Furthermore, by 
reducing the directness of these votes, by not allowing for citizen initiatives and 
by making them advisory, there is not much directness left in the policy-process. 
Instead, referendums are attributed a legitimizing function, a tool for making 
(local) democracy stronger, and to increase the trust in representatives. Therefore, 
the changes in how citizens perceive their local democracy is not due to that they 
are empowered and have the possibility to correct government policy. Neither is it 
tied to that citizens through collective self-government and direct decision making 
are civically educated. Instead, the expectancies on the positive effects of 
referendums should be lowered and attached to that citizens are invited to 
participate in a part of a decision making process. The positive effects of 
government-initiated referendums would therefore be that by giving citizens the 
possibility of partaking in shaping policy, citizens in turn trust and grant their 
elected representatives increased legitimacy (cf. Gilljam & Hermansson, 2003: 
20). From this theoretical argument the following hypothesis can be constructed: 
Citizens who experience local government-initiated referendums will grant their 
local government increased trust and legitimacy. This government-initiative 
hypothesis is an expression of the legitimizing function that these referendums are 
thought to have.  
2.3.2 Representatives and citizens in Swedish municipalities 
As mentioned earlier, one of the key reasons for why direct democracy theory is 
ineffective when studying referendums is the impossibility of getting rid of 
meddlesome elites. Furthermore, if we agree to the notion that referendums 
should be studied as a part of the representative system, and not an expression of 
the opposing democracy tradition, elites should not be regarded as obstacles, but 
as a part of a mutual communication. This excludes the possibility of referendums 
as a way for the people to govern themselves without interference as envisaged by 
Rousseau (1762) and Pateman (1970).  
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The perspective of government-initiated referendums could be said to 
acknowledge two “wills” of the people, one through delegated sovereignty 
(representation) and one through direct voting (SKL, 2013: 21-22). Of these 
competing wills, the model of government-initiated referendums already favours 
the representative will as more legitimate; otherwise the citizen-initiative would 
be an equally supported tool of citizen influence as its government-initiated 
counterpart. Since this balance of power is already established, it is questionable 
of what worth these votes are in terms of letting citizens themselves decide upon 
public policy. 
That this struggle between citizens and elites is skewed in the elites’ favour is 
expressed in another institutional factor in Swedish legislation: All Swedish, local 
and national, referendums are always advisory. By being consultative, local 
government may very well disregard the results of a vote, be it citizen or 
government-initiated (SFS 1991: 900, chap. 5 §34). As displayed in figure 2.3.1, 
this means that the municipal assembly first votes on whether to hold a 
referendum or not, and afterward votes on to what extent the results of the poll 
should be followed. Although Morel (2001: 48) notes that “who initiates the 
referendum?” is the most important variable when studying any effects 
referendums may have, that the referendums are consultative is not without 
importance (ibid: 55). It could be argued that completely disregarding the results 
of a popular vote would be so devastating for the ruling political parties in the 
following municipal assembly election that they would avoid it (Wallin, 2007: 
127). This could also be the reason for why so few citizen-initiatives were 
unsuccessful in getting the approval of the municipal assemblies – politicians did 
not want to risk punishment in the general elections for disregarding the results of 
the referendums (SKL, 2013)
7
.  
At best, citizens participate in shaping policy, but never completely decide 
upon an issue. Thus, if these referendums produce the trust and legitimacy (i.e. 
favourable perceptions of democracy) that the government-initiative hypothesis 
expects, it because of that citizens are invited to participate in shaping policy. In 
return for “being listened to”, citizens are more positive in how they perceive 
democracy. This causal chain has to work in order for government-initiated 
referendums to have their desired effects, increased legitimacy and trust, on 
citizens’ perceptions of democracy. When compared to the direct democratic and 
referendum democratic expectations on referendums, this is more modest, but it is 
also more frail. With “referendum democratic” institutions, such as the citizen 
initiative in California, citizens may actually take action to correct politicians and 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 When the citizen-initiative was strengthened in 2011, several referendums in 2012-2013 (which 
are not included in this analysis) were disregarded by municipal assemblies. This has led to great 
controversy and it is unclear how they have affected the outcome in the general elections of 2014 
(SKL, 2013).   
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are thus empowered. Here, however, we have to rely on some already existing 
support of politicians.  
Lastly, a third factor is that the use of local referendums is sporadic (Election 
Authority 1). While this effectively eliminates the problem of voter fatigue due to 
too frequent votes, it could also implicate that citizens are unfamiliar with what to 
expect from referendums (cf. Ranney & Butler, 1994: 20-21). When pooled 
together over the 10-year period studied in this thesis, the local referendums held 
in Sweden are not few, but it should also be considered that only few 
municipalities hold referendums, and generally only hold one referendum. Any 
effects a referendum may have on citizens can therefore vanish quickly. If 
referendums are to have any lasting effects they would have to be a recurring 
practice (cf. ibid). 
2.3.3 In conclusion 
To explain the effects of referendums I have turned to why they are used. The 
theoretical discussion started with the direct democratic view of collective self-
government. The referendum institute was here seen as the direct democratic way 
of government in contemporary large states without having to rely on 
representation. Through truly collective decision-making, citizens are here 
thought to gain civic virtues and education such as increased political knowledge, 
tolerance and respect. However, this view neglects how referendums are used in 
representative democracies, especially regarding those that are government-
initiated. Studying contemporary referendums as elements of direct democracy 
therefore does not capture (1) what referendums are implemented to do and (2) 
will possibly reject ideal type direct democratic theory without actually studying 
direct democracy. 
By adapting referendums to representative government, the referendum 
democracy concept by Mendelsohn and Parkin (2001) specified that popular votes 
serve as controlling mechanisms where voters were considered as veto-players 
who could reject or promote policy. In such a scenario citizens are empowered in 
relation to elites, while the direct democratic elements of self-government are 
diminished. However, their argument relies on that citizens can exercise this 
control by initiating referendums and by binding legislators to their will, which 
does not apply to the government-initiated referendums. Furthermore, as Gerber 
(2004, 2001) pointed out, even if referendums are initiated by citizens, and even if 
government is bound to adhere to the results, elites still find ways to manipulate 
policy in ways that favour their goals. 
To further adjust the study of referendums to the representative model they 
take place in, it was argued that their effects on citizens are found in the relation 
between citizens and representation. Referendum democratic theory specifies that 
this occurs through increasing the power of citizens, which does not apply to 
government-initiated referendums. Government-initiated referendums can only 
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affect citizens’ perceptions of democracy through the invitation to participate in 
shaping policy, not through empowerment. The effects of that kind of 
participation can thus be narrowed down to how citizens think of the local 
democracy and representation. The possible positive effects, expressed in the 
government-initiative hypothesis, that can be observed are in citizens’ perceptions 
of democracy – trust and legitimacy of government. 
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3 Methodology 
The impact government-initiated referendums may have on perceptions of 
democracy is tested on the case of local referendums in Swedish municipalities 
over a period of 11 years
8
. To reveal whether referendums contribute to changes 
in the citizens’ perceptions of democracy, I employ national survey data for the 
period 2002-2012 from the SOM-institute. The surveys are independent cross 
sections but with repeated questions. With access to several years of 
independently pooled cross sections it is possible to make observations before and 
after referendums, while not having to rely on empirical evidence from single 
cross-sections. The measures of perceptions of democracy are (1) Satisfaction 
with local democracy, (2) trust in municipal boards generally and (3) trust in the 
municipal board of the respondent’s municipality. 
In this chapter the methodological choices are discussed in greater detail. In 
the first section I discuss why the case study design is necessary and why the 
Swedish local referendums can provide evidence that can add to our knowledge of 
referendums in general, and government-initiated referendums in particular. This 
section also includes a description of the case to provide a contextual framework. 
Section 3.2 Survey data briefly describes the surveys which are used to make pre-
referendum and post-referendum observations in perceptions of democracy. In 
section 3.3 Measures, the measures of independent and dependent variables are 
described and discussed. Lastly, in section 3.4 Analyzing perceptions of 
democracy I discuss the practical methods and introduce the statistical tests. 
3.1 The case 
Since many contributions to the study of referendums are made from evidence 
based on the experiences of one country (ex. Jungar, 2007; Franklin et al. 1994), a 
single-country case study is not a surprising design. The publications that 
incorporate several countries are often descriptive and try to find differences and 
similarities in how referendums work under different constitutions (ex. Ranney & 
Butler, 1994; Qvortrup, 2014). The most important aspect for using a case study 
design is that referendums are regulated in different ways depending on country. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 As a reference, in Gerring’s (2004: 343-344) typology of case study designs, this could probably 
qualify as a type 3 case study. 
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For example, several countries regulate their referendums through quorums 
which, depending on voter turnout, make referendums legitimate or not
9
. 
Comparing those cases to countries without a quorum regulation makes the 
analysis difficult – especially if we have a large sample of referendums with both 
high and low turnout (such as in this thesis). Another factor which complicates 
cross-national comparisons is whether referendums can be initiated by citizens 
and/or government – a factor which is of great importance in this study. In fact, an 
important reason for studying Sweden is that the country has had a long period 
where almost all referendums were government-initiated, making it possible to 
develop theory and test it without interfering elements of citizen-initiatives.  
For this thesis, the case study also has other qualities that outweigh the values 
of a more extensive study. First, this is a study of local politics where the 
referendums take place in sub-national entities (municipalities). Although 
(almost) all states allow for decentralised government, the legal regulations of 
local parliaments vary greatly between countries (John, 2001: 17). Furthermore, 
since my research question asks for changes in perceptions of democracy we have 
to take the availability of material into consideration. With access to annual 
national surveys with repeated measures on perceptions of democracy for the 
period 2002-2012, the Swedish case provides opportunities for exploring the 
empirical evidence. This time frame was chosen mostly due to data availability – 
all three questions on perceptions of democracy are included first in 2002. 
However, it still constitutes an extensive period for studying local referendums, 
It should be stated that I deviate from the case studies of national referendums 
in some aspects. The first, and perhaps most obvious, difference is regarding the 
level on which the referendums take place. With local decision-making I have a 
large amount of autonomous polities (290 municipalities) that in theory act 
independently of each other. Other studies of sub-national referendums have 
mostly considered state-level direct democracy in the U.S. (ex. Matsusaka, 2005), 
and similarities between such states and Swedish municipalities are small, if 
nonexistent. However, analysing Swedish municipal referendums presents the 
possibility to study a much larger set of equal political entities empirically than 
analyses of national or state-level referendums does. Another advantage of 
studying the local referendums in Sweden is that all municipalities adhere to the 
same legal regulations regarding referendums, which neither American states nor 
nations do. These legal regulations also remain unchanged during the years 2002-
2010
10
. A similar approach is not possible on the national level due to crucial 
differences in what referendums constitute (cf. Setälä, 2006: 711). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9
 The line is often drawn at 50 %. With participation beneath that line, the referendum is 
illegitimate. (Jungar, 2005) 
10
 The only referendum held in 2011 was in Ängelholm. This was citizen initiated but was still 
included on the analysis. 
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Using survey data as the empirical material is not an all too frequently used 
method in case studies of referendums (for other studies using the method see 
Bowler & Donovan, 2004; Tolbert et al, 2003). However, by pooling repeated 
national cross-sectional surveys it is possible to gain knowledge on the impact 
government-initiated referendums may have on citizens not just at one point of 
time, but over time. Because of the long period, 2002-2012, I can also include 
many more referendums than possible in a single cross section. The Swedish case 
thus constitutes a case for developing and testing a theoretical argument of 
government-initiatives (cf. Golden, 2005: 6)  
An observation on the Swedish case is that, with regards to the dependent 
variables, Sweden is a tough case for any theory of effects of referendums, even 
the more modest government-initiative hypothesis presented here. Swedish 
citizens are generally satisfied with the democratic governance and although less 
keen on liking their representatives, the democratic institutions are stable and are 
reviewed as such by citizens (Möller, 1998; SOM-institute, 2013: 9, 40). Since 
attitudes towards government and democracy are already favourable, making 
them even better with any intervention, such as letting local governments hold 
referendums, could be hard. However, as stated in the theory section, the 
referendums were made available to municipalities in order to infuse legitimacy 
into local democracy, and in order to close an increasing gap between 
representatives and citizens
11
. When adding this to the fact that the government-
initiative hypothesis I introduced relies on a somewhat frail causal chain (that 
citizen’s feel listened to after being invited to participate in a popular vote) we can 
still be sceptical towards the extent the local referendums have affected citizens’ 
perceptions of democracy. 
3.1.1 A guide to local referendums in Sweden 
The Swedish case of local referendums presents an intriguing case for the student 
of referendums. Since the year 1980 the constitution allows for referendums to be 
held not just in national legislation but for municipal- and regional-level policy 
decisions. As of 2014 the election authority reports that 120 local referendums 
have taken place (Election authority 1)
12
. This may seem like a large figure, but 
one should remember that these are spread over more than three decades and 290 
individual municipalities. Not every municipality has held a referendum, and 
those who have seldom hold a second (ibid). According to Wallin (2007: 74-80) 
this may be because of a lack of a “referendum culture”. This would be true also 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11
 That a gap exists is certain. However, portraying it as ”increasing” is hard to justify when 
reviewing national averages (SOM-institute: 2013: 9) 
12
 With exception for Luleå 2003”local road use” and in Norsjö 2003 ”Water protection project” 
(which are reported in Kaufmann, 2011, 258). All referendums included in the analysis are listed 
in Appendix A1. 
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for national level, with only six referendums from 1922, and the regional level 
with one referendum in 2013
13
. The use of local referendums has increased when 
comparing the 2000’s and 2010’s to the period before (Election authority 1), with 
peaks in 2003 and 2006 when the municipalities of Stockholm voted on 
congestion charges. During the timeframe of the analysis in this thesis, 2002-
2012, 63 referendums were held. I therefore have a substantial amount of 
referendums that can be studied. The yearly frequencies of local referendums are 
reported in graph 3.1.1. 
Until 1994 the Local Government Act of 1977 regulated the municipalities’ 
use of local referendums. Referendums could then be initiated only by the local 
government (institutionally initiated) and were always advisory (Wallin, 2007: 
78). With the constitutional amendment of 1994 the act changed, but only in 
detail. However, the amendment of 1994 saw the new Municipal Referenda Act 
(SFS 1994:692) introduced, which specified how a referendum should be carried 
out. With this change, the citizen initiative was also introduced. Citizens could 
then initiate a referendum-process by getting 5 % of the population in a 
municipality to sign a petition. However, only if a majority in the municipal 
assembly approved of the referendum would it actually be held. Kaufmann (2011: 
258) reports that about 150 such petitions were successful in surpassing the 5 % 
threshold, but that only 10 of those were not denied by respective municipal 
assembly. Wallin (2007: 124) lists 84 successful 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 3.1.1: Frequencies of local referendums in Sweden by year Source: 
Kaufmann (2011: 265-267) and the Swedish Election Authority (Election 
Authority 1) 
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petitions whereof 8 were put to a popular vote
14
. Thus, even if a referendum was 
citizen initiated, it had to be government-sponsored. This changed with the 
constitutional amendment of 2011, which strengthened the citizen initiative so 
that only if 2/3 of a municipal assembly opposed a citizen initiative would it be 
denied. This has led to several citizen initiated referendums. However, since this 
analysis is conducted within the time-frame of 2002-2012 only one referendum 
(2011 in Ängelholm) was a product of this new policy. Therefore, the legal 
regulations that have to be taken into account are those of 1994. 
The Local Government Act specifies that: 
 
The assembly may decide that, as part of the preparation of a matter 
to be discussed by the assembly, viewpoints are to be obtained from 
members of the municipality or county council. This can be done by 
means of a referendum, an opinion poll or similar procedure. (SFS 
1991:900 chap. 5 §34)  
 
The Act lists referendums, opinion polls and the mysterious “similar 
procedures”15 as the ways in which local government may let their citizens 
express their views through popular votes. Since this thesis is focused solely on 
referendums no data is gathered, and no analysis is conducted regardin “opinion 
polls and similar procedures”. 
A second important aspect is that the referendum is “just” a part of the policy 
process and as such advisory. As mentioned earlier, Swedish referendums on the 
local level are never binding. Local government may very well disregard the 
results of a referendum. The practice, however, has been that the governing 
party/parties declare that they will abide to the results of the vote, which they 
almost always have (Wallin, 2007: 124).  
What characterises Swedish municipal referendums? An examination of the 
referendums that are included in this analysis reveals that 9 are topics on changing 
the name of a municipality and merging/partition of municipalities. The other 
referendums deal with a broad spectrum of topics, from infrastructure projects to 
welfare. Another characteristic is that Swedish citizens are less likely to go to the 
polling stations in local referendums than in the general elections. The average 
voter turnout in the municipal assembly elections for 2014 was 84,8 % (Election 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14
 Unfortunately, none of the two authors give any indication as to which referendums were 
citizen-initiated.  
15
 Although no empirics are gathered on ”similar procedures” or opinion polls, one could imagine 
that such procedures could include electronic voting on minor issues. For an overview of e-
democracy in Swedish municipalities see SOU: 1999:12. For an overview of local democracy 
projects, which can include such opinion polls, see Montin (1998) Some frequency statistics for 
opinion polls in Swedish municipalities for late 1990’s and early 2000’s is available in (Gilljam et 
al, 2003: 11) 
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Authority 2) while the average turnout for the referendums analysed here is 64,6 
%
16
. 
In conclusion, Swedish local governments have held referendums, which were 
almost exclusively government-initiated, over a long period. With survey-data 
that has measures for the dependent variable for 11 of these years, and with 63 
referendums from comparable political entities, the Swedish case can be used to 
draw conclusions about government-initiated referendums.  
 
3.2 Survey data 
The data used in the analysis is survey material. The surveys that are used here are 
the annual, national SOM-surveys which measure attitudes regarding society, 
media and politics. The surveys have been conducted each year from 1986 and are 
thus a rich source for assessing Swedish trends. In this thesis I am using the SOM 
Institute Cumulative Dataset (Super-Riks-SOM), which is a pooled dataset 
including all questions that have been asked at least three times during the years 
1986-2012. The cross-sections are conducted yearly and constitute representative 
samples of the Swedish population.  
Respondents are chosen through systematic probability sampling based on the 
Swedish population and address register (SOM Institute – Codebook, 2014: 5), 
not all too different from simple random sampling. The sizes of the samples range 
between 6000 (years 2000-2008) and 12000 (year 2012)
17
. Due to the large 
samples, and by pooling the cross sections, it is possible to make observations on 
smaller groups. Since Swedish municipalities can be small, the large sample sizes 
allow for making observations of respondents who live in smaller municipalities 
which have held referendums.  
3.3 Measures 
3.3.1 Observing referendums in survey data 
Working with survey data and having referendums as the independent variable 
can be difficult. Since the SOM-surveys do not ask respondents whether they have 
voted in a referendum, the observation has to be made some other way. I rely on 
data of where respondents lived and at what time to determine if they have 
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 Highest in Danderyd 2006: 81,6 %. Lowest in Karlstad 2002, 33 % 
17
 Year 2000-2008: 6 000, year 2009-2011: 9000, year 2012: 12000 (SOM Institute, 2014: 4) 
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experienced a referendum or not. If they live in a municipality (identified in the 
data by municipal codes) that has held a referendum in the previous year, they are 
measured as having experienced a referendum. 
The theoretical discussion was concluded by saying that the “invitation to 
participate in shaping policy” is what could make citizens regard their 
representatives and local democracy higher. In other words, this is the mechanism 
which can explain possible causality between the independent and dependent 
variable. Since an invitation to participate in the policy process does not have to 
imply actual voting we can reformulate it to “experiencing a referendum” – as 
formulated in the hypothesis. Even if a person does not perform the act of voting, 
s/he is still subject to news coverage, campaigning (although maybe not very 
extensive, see Wallin, 2007: 177-181) and the implementation of a resulting 
decision. Although measuring “voting in a referendum” could be a more accepted 
measure, much like voting in a general election trumps experiencing an election, 
the measure “experiencing a referendum” works for uncovering changes 
measured before and after the event of a popular vote. It could be seen as a 
compromise between using individual-level data, but with aggregate-level 
measures (cf. Tolbert et al, 2003: 28). 
Survey-respondents who have experienced a referendum are in this thesis 
identified by if they lived in a municipality the year after a referendum was held. 
E.g. the municipality Örkelljunga holds a referendum in 2003, then the 
respondents who lives in the municipality the year after are coded as 1=having 
experienced a referendum. This means that for every year that referendums where 
held, the subsequent year respondents who live in those municipalities are 
measured as having experienced the referendums. 
Identifying respondents who have experienced a referendum the year after the 
actual event has three reasons. First, it is unknown when the referendums are held 
during the year. Neither Kaufmann (2011), Wallin (2007) nor the election 
authority (Election Authority 1), has any information, which means that we 
cannot be certain that a respondent has submitted the survey responses after the 
referendum. Therefore, by measuring a year afterwards we can be certain that the 
survey was carried out after the referendum. The second aspect is that if 
experiencing a referendum causes any changes in the perceptions of democracy of 
citizens, then they should be manifest the year after as well. Lastly, since 
municipal assemblies later have to decide upon whether the results of the 
referendum should be followed or not, and since they may change parts of the 
policy, the actual decision and the subsequent implementation may not take place 
until later. 
This way of observing referendums in survey data could have some 
drawbacks. We do not know if the respondent actually participated by voting. 
Distinguishing between voters and non-voters could give empirical evidence to 
the argument that actual participation is required in order to change perceptions of 
democracy. Theoretical support of such an argument can be found in Whipple’s 
(2005) discussion of Dewey’s philosophy of participation. However, we do know 
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that citizens have experienced the referendum through invitation and possible 
campaigning. Measuring the year after also means that the municipal assembly 
most probably has made a decision on the policy that was voted on. Secondly, we 
cannot ascertain if the respondent lived in the municipality at the year of the 
referendum. However, since very few move across municipal boarders frequently 
(SCB 1), this uncertainty is manageable. 
The lack of measures of voting in sub-national referendums is by some 
researchers handled by using aggregate data, such as state-level measures in the 
U.S. (ex. Hill & Leighley 1999). Others rely on cross-sectional data (ex. Bowler 
& Donovan, 2002). However, since I want to study change in individual-level 
relationships aggregate data do not give a satisfactory solution. Purely cross-
sectional data may work, but it does not capture the importance of change over 
time when evaluating the effects of an event (a referendum) (Vedung, 2009: 252). 
Furthermore, a single cross-section could only cover a few referendums while this 
study includes all referendums held in the period 2002-2011.  
The method of observing referendums I use is similar to an empirical analysis 
of citizen initiatives in American states by Tolbert et al (2003). However, instead 
of observing referendums as a binary event, they use a continuous scale of “the 
number of initiatives appearing on the statewide ballot in the each year” (ibid: 28). 
Also, they do not pool the data from their three surveys due to differences in the 
survey items.  
All 63 Swedish local referendums have been entered in the data set according 
to the method described above. Among those, the votes held in Stockholm in 2003 
and 2006 combined represent 27 (roughly 41%). Data on the referendums was 
collected from the Swedish election authority (Election Authority 1) and 
Kaufmann (2011: 258). When combining all these post-referendum observation 
1139 respondents were identified as 1=having experienced a referendum (See 
Appendix A table A2). 
3.3.2 Operational indicators – perceptions of democracy 
Perceptions of democracy were in the theoretical chapter defined as “citizens’ 
opinions and beliefs of their political environment”. The impact of government-
initiated referendums on perceptions of democracy that could be supported by 
theory was an increased legitimacy of and trust in local government. Trust and 
legitimacy here serve as indicators of perceptions of democracy.  
Perceptions of democracy is measured with three operational indicators:  
 
1. Satisfaction with democracy in respondent’s municipality 
2. Confidence in how municipal boards generally handle their jobs 
3. Confidence in how the municipal board in respondent’s municipality handles its job 
(2002-2008) 
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The question on confidence in how the municipality board works is available 
for the period 2002-2008, and is thus not included in the analysis of the years 
2009-2012. 
Indicator (1) Satisfaction with democracy in respondent’s municipality was in 
the surveys formulated as: 
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in: - The 
municipality where you live (SOM Institute – codebook, 2014:161) 
This indicator tells us how citizens perceive the overall democratic governance in 
their municipality. The wording allows respondents themselves to define the term 
“democracy” and what standards are satisfactory. The indicator is closely 
connected to the “perceptions of democracy” concept. While it does not explicitly 
asks for opinions on trust and legitimacy it does provide an accurate measurement 
of what citizens think of the overall governance. The questionnaire has four 
options ranging from “Not at all satisfied” to “very satisfied”, thus disabling the 
respondent from picking a neutral option. 
Indicator (2) Trust in municipality boards: 
How much confidence do you have in the way the following institutions and 
groups do their job? – Municipal boards (SOM Institute - codebook, 2014: 
118) 
The second indicator measures the dimension of trust and legitimacy. It asks for 
the opinions on municipal boards in general which means that it is uncertain how 
much citizens weigh their experiences from their municipality of residence 
compared to others. The municipal boards include representatives from opposition 
parties as well as governing parties. How well informed parts of the Swedish 
population is of this distinction from the national government, which only 
includes governing parties, is uncertain. The questionnaire has five options from 
“Very low trust” to “Very high trust” with a neutral option. 
Indicator (3) Confidence in how the municipality board works in respondent’s 
municipality: 
How do you think the municipal government where you live is doing its job? 
(SOM Institute – codebook, 2014: 162) 
This indicator is in both wording
18
 and meaning almost a duplicate of indicator (2) 
with the difference that respondents are being asked about their municipality of 
residence. The answers range from “Very bad” to “Very good” with a neutral 
option. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18
 The English edition of the code book has separate translations of “kommunstyrelse” – municipal 
board and municipal government. For some reason the English term is different but the 
questionnaire was using the same word for both questions. (SOM Institute – codebook, 2014: 162, 
118) 
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The operationalizations are closely connected to the dependent variable 
perceptions of democracy and reflect the indicators trust and legitimacy of local 
government which are found in the hypothesis. All three survey items ask 
respondents about local level politics. Secondly, they are formulated in a way that 
emphasises trust towards the democratic system, not towards a certain politician 
(e.g. the mayor) or the ruling majority. This is favourable since the research 
question asks for perceptions of democracy, not perceptions of the incumbent or 
current government. A third factor is that both the first and third question asks the 
respondent about the municipality s/he resides in. Thus, the measures do not have 
to rely on the assumption that the respondent is first hand thinking of the 
municipality of residence. In 2008, trust in “one’s own” municipal board is 
excluded from the analysis. Therefore, with this variable, it is only possible to 
study the referendums held in the years 2002-2006
19
.  
None of the three indicators explicitly asks about legitimacy. However, both 
indicators on trust in municipal boards cover legitimacy. “Confidence in how a 
municipal board does its job” lets the respondents’ judge the municipal boards’ 
efforts and achievements on grounds set by the respondents themselves. Since we 
cannot know how the respondents define the concepts used in the survey 
questions this becomes an uncertainty we have to cope with – just as in survey 
methods in general (for a more precise account of measuring legitimacy through 
surveys see Weatherford, 1992). 
Thus, three likert-scale survey items are used as indicators on perceptions of 
democracy. These were all recoded to dichotomous variables. For the two 
variables on trust in municipal boards, respondents who picked high trust or very 
high trust were coded as 1= high trust, and the other as 0=low trust. The coding 
was identical for the variable on satisfaction with local democracy. The neutral 
option in the two variables on trust in municipal boards is also coded as 0=low 
trust since this means that respondents have to actively trust their elected 
representatives in order to display favourable perceptions of democracy. 
 The reason for this proceeding is derived from theory. The change between, 
e.g. very low to low trust in municipal boards after a referendum is not of very 
high interest when trying to determine whether the local referendum has had an 
impact on citizens. The step between low trust to high trust, however, more 
accurately reflects if citizens regard their local government and democracy more 
positively after a referendum. In the analysis this dichotomy is described as 0=less 
favourable perceptions of democracy and 1=favourable perceptions of 
democracy.
20
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 Since ”experiencing a referendum” was measured in the year after, and since no local 
referendums were held in 2007) 
20
 To see how the three indicators on perceptions of democracy are correlated I refer to Appendix 
C 
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3.4 Analysing perceptions of democracy 
Respondents who have experienced referendums were identified as those who live 
in a municipality the year after a referendum was held. To measure effects these 
respondents have to be compared to another category. This can either be done by 
comparing to the same population (citizens of the municipalities that have held 
referendums) but at an earlier point of time, or by standard cross-sectional 
analysis where the group of comparison is respondents living in municipalities 
without referendums (Vedung, 2009: 250-255). The approach chosen here is the 
former. With access to repeated surveys it is possible to observe change over time 
in perceptions of democracy, but within the same geographical units. Since the 
questions in the SOM surveys are identical from year to year this also facilitates 
pooling of the data without having to worry about differing measures (cf. 
Firebaugh, 1997: 14). 
The observation before a referendum is made on the same logic as the 
observation after: Since it is unknown when respondents experience a referendum 
or answer their questionnaires in the year of a referendum, the observation is 
made the year before. Thus, those who have not experienced a referendum are 
identified as those who live in the same municipalities as those who have, but two 
years before. This could be described as a simple pretest-posttest design (cf. Mark 
et al, 2000: 265-267). We have t-1 (pre-referendum observation), t (referendum) 
and t+1 (post-referendum observation), where the perceptions of democracy are 
studied as changing over time. I am therefore treating “experienced referendums” 
as a binary event. It could also be described as having experienced a referendum 
(t+1), or being about to experience a referendum (t-1), and at both points in time 
perceptions of democracy is measured. This could also be compared to an 
interrupted time-series design, although with the difference that I here only cover 
one measure before and one after (cf. Vedung, 2009: 243). Thus, the quantitative 
empirics are used to study change over time, which gives evidence on the effects 
of the event (the referendum) which occurs between the two observations (ibid). 
When employing this sort of method, a problem is the post hoc fallacy
21
. If we 
imagine that respondents have more favourable perceptions in the post-
referendum observations, this does not directly imply causation with the local 
referendum held in the year before. However, with the repeated survey material it 
is possible to control for both individual level factors, such as education and 
income, and factors specific for studying social change, such as period-effects, 
other events or population overturn (Firebaugh, 1997). Period-effects are general 
trends, e.g. during economic recession when unemployment is higher, it is 
plausible that citizens are not as trusting of politicians. Other events, exogenous or 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 Post hoc ergo propter hoc – “after this, therefore because of this". 
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endogenous, that may affect how citizens perceive local democracy could for 
example include general elections or political scandals. Population overturn, or 
cohort-effects, is simply that with time, the population changes; when comparing 
teenage respondents in 2002 with the same category in 2012, it is not the same 
pool of respondents. In fact, Ryder (1965: 859-861) argues that since cohort 
effects and period effects complement each other, aggregate social change far 
outpaces individual change. If this study would use pooled data for a longer 
period, say 20 years, these factors would require more consideration. However, 
with fewer years the population turnover is not quite as severe (cf. Firebaugh, 
1997: 45). If needed, the survey data could be used to control for such effects (for 
one such analysis see Abramson & Aldrich, 1982). 
In the initial descriptive statistics, which compares perceptions of democracy 
in the pre-referendum observation and the post-referendum observation, 
respondents are pooled together based on which year a referendum was held. For 
example, respondents in the survey of 2003 who lived in municipalities that held 
referendums in 2004 are coded as 0=about to experience a referendum, while 
respondents in the survey of 2005 who live in the same municipalities are coded 
as 1=having experienced a referendum. While this does not pool respondents over 
time, it pools them over municipal boarders. In the later logistic regression 
analysis all these pre-referendum respondents were pooled together as 0, and all 
post-referendum respondents as 1, pooling them over the full cumulative data set 
from 2002-2012. Since the SOM-surveys do not oversample certain groups, this 
approach creates two observations of perceptions of democracy for all local 
referendums, based on representative samples of the national population in the 
period 2002-2012. For the referendums of 2002, the before-observation is made in 
2002. The reason for this is that the three indicators on perceptions of democracy 
were not available in 2001.  
Altogether, 1055 respondents across all years were identified as about to 
experience a referendum, and 1139 as having experienced a referendum (See 
Appendix A2 table A2 for assessment of individual years). 
Throughout the statistical analyses I use odds and odds ratios for presenting 
the results. This is natural due to the fact that both independent and dependent 
variables have binary outcomes. Reporting odds in the descriptive statistics may 
not be necessary, but it facilitates comparisons with the later logistic regression. 
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4 Results 
In this section it is tested whether local referendums lead to changes in citizens’ 
perceptions of democracy. With the government-initiative hypothesis
22
, it is 
expected that an increase in favourable perceptions of democracy should occur.  
In the first part of the empirical examination I present a comparison between 
the pre-referendum observation and the post-referendum observation to determine 
if respondents who have experienced a referendum to a higher extent display 
favourable perceptions of democracy. This is done by pooling respondents 
together based on the year of referendums. In the second section the effects of 
referendums are further investigated with logistic regression to verify whether the 
relationship is statistically significant, and in order to enter control variables. For 
the regression, all pre-referendum observations are pooled together, and so are the 
post-referendum observations.   
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
A first empirical examination of how referendums affect citizens’ perceptions of 
democracy is presented in comparisons of average odds. These are average odds 
of having favourable perceptions of democracy (e.g. the odds of being satisfied, 
rather than dissatisfied, with local democracy). For this analysis the referendums 
were grouped by year (e.g. respondents who live in municipalities that held 
referendums in 2003 are grouped together as “having experienced a referendum in 
2003”). The category of comparison is respondents from the same municipalities 
but from the year before the referendum.  
The odds (where odds = p/(1-p)) are calculated from percentages in the three 
dependent variables in the year before and the year after a group of referendums 
independently of each other. The mean of these odds are presented in table 
4.1.1
23
.  
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 Citizens who experience local referendums will grant their local government increased trust and 
legitimacy. 
23
 Finding differences in perceptions of democracy before and after a referendum with use of odds 
also facilitate comparison with the later logistic regression. However, these are for comparisons 
only, since the average odds presented here are not the basis for the logits and odds ratios in the 
regression model.   
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Table 4.1.1 Differences in average odds between the year before and year after for 
referendums grouped by year. 
 
Satisfaction with 
local democracy 
Trust in municipal 
boards generally 
Trust in respondents 
municipal board† 
 Average odds (n) Average odds (n) Average odds (n) 
Pre-referendum 
One year before 
1,4226 
(839) 
0,3107 
(994) 
0,3618 
(396) 
Post-referendum 
One year after 
2,2411 
(1092) 
0,3409 
(1074) 
0,5347 
(632) 
Ratios 1,5754 1,0972 1,4779 
    
Comment: “Odds” are here defined as p/(1-p). The figures reported here are the mean values of the 
odds for every group of year & referendum. For comparison to the original odds and percentages 
they were calculated from see Appendix B table B1. The ratios are obtained by dividing odds the 
year after with the comparing group of the year before. Here they serve as measures of change 
between the two points of observation.  
†Trust in respondents municipal board is only available for 2002-2008. Since no referendums 
were held in 2007, the last referendums to be reported in these scores are those of 2006 (measured 
before=2005 and after=2007) 
 
 
Although “average odds” may not be a standard unit of measurement, they here 
provide comparable estimates of how likely it is that respondents have favourable 
perceptions of democracy in a single score for every observation. 
From the results we can see that being satisfied with local democracy is the 
only indicator that shows that respondents are generally more satisfied than 
dissatisfied (average odds over 1) in observations both before and after. A 
possible explanation is the lack of a neutral option in the survey item, making 
respondents actively choose if the favour the local democracy or not. The two 
variables on how respondents regard municipal boards show lower average odds, 
all below 1. Furthermore, respondents seem to regard the work of their own 
municipal board higher (with the average odds of 0,3618 and 0,5347) than the 
work of municipal boards generally (0,3107 and 0,3409). More interestingly for 
the question asked in this paper, the results indicate an increase in the average 
odds between the year before and year after a referendum across all dependent 
variables. Respondents have more favourable perceptions of democracy in the 
year following a referendum than in the year before. The ratios reported in the 
table show the difference between the observations before and after, and serve as 
indicators of how large the change is. For the variable “trust in municipal boards 
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generally” the change between the average odds is the ratio of 1,0972. In other 
words, if the average odds of the year before (0,3107) is multiplied by ratio 
(1,0972) we get the average odds of the year after measurement (0,3409).
24
  
This initial examination of the data shows that respondents who live in 
municipalities that have held referendums are more likely to regard their local 
democracy and representatives higher – an increase in favourable perceptions of 
democracy. The results speak in favour of government-initiative hypothesis. 
Indeed, if we regard this change over time as a direct measure of the impact of the 
local referendums, they could be deemed as successful in “strengthening the 
positions of elected and parties” (Wallin, 2007: 82). However, the ratios reported 
above does not tell us whether the change is significant. Furthermore, it is 
unknown whether this change actually depends on the referendums held in the 
years between observations or if other factors are the sources of change, such as 
period-effects or other events (cf. Firebaugh, 1997). Thus, although the 
descriptive statistics point to positive effects of referendums, not to far-reaching 
conclusions should be drawn from the analysis. 
4.2 Logistic regression 
Statistics that show differences between measurements the year before and the 
year after a referendum were produced as average odds in the previous section. 
The descriptive results showed that respondents seem to have higher perceptions 
of democracy in the year after a referendum than in the year before. In this 
section, it is tested whether this increase over time is statistically significant with 
regression analysis. Since the indicators are dichotomous, logistic regression is 
used
25
. 
In the previous analysis the respondents were grouped together by the year the 
referendums were held, and the average odds were the mean of the odds to have 
favourable perceptions of democracy in the years before and after referendums. A 
similar approach is taken in the regression analysis, but instead of measuring the 
perceptions of democracy on the basis of the year of referendums and then 
obtaining an average, all observations before and after were pooled together. The 
respondents who lived in a municipality in the year after a referendum was held 
were all pooled together as 1=having experienced a referendum. Respondents 
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 Yet again the simple rule that values over 1 indicates an increase applies.  
25
 As noted in the methodology chapter: Another approach would be to keep them as 5 or 4-scale 
likert items and run an ordinal regression. However, the point of interest for this thesis is to see 
whether referendums (change over time) make citizens move from distrusting to trusting or from 
dissatisfied to satisfied, not the steps between, say very dissatisfied to dissatisfied. The logits 
produced in a logistic regression therefore produce a closer result compared to what the theoretical 
discussion expects. 
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from the same municipalities but in the year before the referendum were coded as 
0=not having experienced a referendum. In the analysis this dummy variable is 
Table 4.2.1 Changes in perceptions of democracy between the year before and 
after referendums, binary logistic regression. 
 
Trust in respondents 
municipal board† 
 
Trust in municipal boards 
generally 
 β 
Odds 
ratio 
S.E 
 
β 
Odds 
ratio 
S:E. 
Year after (0-1) ,108 1,114 ,131 ,206 1,229 ,115 
Constant -,612** ,524 ,102 -1,543** ,214 ,085 
Pseudo  R
2
 
(Nagelkerke)  
,001 ,003 
n 1053 1978 
Table 4.2.1 
continued 
Satisfaction with local 
democracy 1 
 
Satisfaction with local 
democracy 2 
 β 
Odds 
ratio 
S.E.  β 
Odds 
ratio 
S.E. 
Year after (0-1) ,297* 1,346 ,095 
 
,607 1,835 ,337 
Political interest  
 
   ,048 1,049 ,090 
Political interest × 
Year after (0-1) 
   -,123 ,884 ,121 
Constant ,210* 1,234 ,071 ,090 1,094 ,129 
Pseudo R
2 
(Nagelkerke) 
,007  ,007 
n 1856  1838 
Comment: The table displays logits (β) Odds ratios (antilogs) and standard error. The 
reference group are the respondents in the year before a referendum. All variables in 
the analyses are dichotomous.  
The “Political interest” variable reports coefficient and odds ratio for respondents of 
the year before while the “Political interest×Year after” reports for political interest in 
the year after a referendum in reference to the year before. 
† Trust in respondents municipal board is only available for 2002-2008. 
* indicates significance at p<,05. ** Indicates significance at p<,01 
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named “year after”. Thus, respondents of municipalities without referendums are 
excluded from the analyses, while those of the year before constitute the reference 
group. 
The results of the binary logistic regressions are presented in table 4.2.1. The 
original models are bivariate, where the measure is what effect time has on the 
dependent variable. Those who lived in municipalities prior to referendums were 
throughout the analyses used as reference groups. The coefficients therefore 
indicate the change in the odds to have favourable perceptions of democracy from 
this category to those who live in the same municipalities two years after (for a 
more detailed review of a similar model see Firebaugh, 1997: 42-63). 
A first comment on the results is that all coefficients are positive. Like the 
previous analysis, these regressions indicate that respondents who live in 
municipalities during the year after a referendum regard their local democracy and 
representatives higher. However, this change is only statistically significant with 
the dependent variable “satisfaction with local democracy”. Thus, the increase in 
odds we saw in the earlier analysis for trust in both respondents’ own municipal 
boards and municipal boards generally is not supported here.  
With the logit 0,297, and the odds ratio 1,346, a positive change between the 
two observations of satisfaction with local democracy can be seen. Although the 
odds ratios in table 4.1.1 do not add up to those reported here, because of the 
different ways of pooling the data, it is clear that an increase of 1,346 seems 
plausible when comparing to the earlier statistics.  If this gross effect (only 
measuring change over time) is interpreted as the impact of the local referendums 
this has implications for my theoretical argument of government-initiated 
referendums. Closing the gap between citizens and representatives was one of the 
main reasons for Swedish municipalities to make use of government-initiated 
referendums, and the reason for focusing the government-initiative hypothesis on 
legitimacy and trust. If government-initiated referendums only make citizens 
regard their local democracy overall higher, that implies representative do not 
gain anything by initiating referendums
26
.  
In order to assess whether this increase in satisfaction is robust, a second 
model includes political interest as a control variable. How interested you are in 
politics in general has a well documented effect on political participation as well 
as knowledge of the democratic system (cf. Esaiasson et al, 2011). In this model 
political interest is coded as a dummy variable
27
. Political interest was also 
included as an interaction term (Political interest×Year after), which allows a 
change between the year before and the year after. Since the reference category is 
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 With exception for possible short term goals which are unrelated to perceptions of democracy 
(cf. Morel, 2001; cf Rahat, 2009: 102). 
27
 The coding followed the same procedure as for the dependent variables. Very little interest to 
little interest in politics is coded as 0=not interested in politics, and interested to very interested as 
1=interested in politics.  
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still the respondents of “the year before”, this becomes necessary28. Firebaugh 
(1997: 46-47) refers to a model constructed on similar grounds as a ”changing-
parameter model”. 
When controlling for interest in politics the year after-coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant, and neither are the variables on political interest nor the 
constant. Thus, the local referendums of Sweden do not contribute to any change 
in perceptions of democracy within the municipalities. 
It could be argued that the positive effects of the government-initiated 
referendums would only occur if the participation is high enough. High voter 
turnout indicates that citizens bother enough to go to the polling stations and can 
thus serve as an indicator on the importance of an issue. However, when running 
duplicates of the logistic regressions reported in table 4.2.1, but only including 
referendums with high turnout (here defined as >65 %)
29
, that produces an almost 
identical result (see Appendix B table B1). Even when under good circumstances, 
with high voter turnout, the changes in citizens’ perceptions of democracy 
between the two years were not significant. 
When compared to results from research with similar methods but focused on 
citizen-initiatives in the U.S. (Tolbert et al, 2003; Bowler & Donovan, 2004), the 
results I report above are contradictory to their findings. Although they have 
different measures on perceptions of democracy, since they rely on direct 
democratic theory, a methodological difference is that they do not pool their 
repeated surveys but use them for purely cross-sectional analyses. It is possible 
that the reason for the absence of significant results in the logistic regression is not 
that government-initiated local referendums do not produce positive outcomes, 
but just that they cannot be observed when having the reference group as 
respondents from the same municipalities but two years before. To construct an 
analysis comparable to Tolbert et al (2003), and Bowler and Donovan’s studies, 
the surveys would have to be pooled together and treated as single cross-sections. 
I therefore pooled the surveys of 2003-2005, 2006-2009
30
 and 2010-2012 (thus 
comprising the periods between general elections) and obtained correlation 
coefficients (tau-b). These coefficients measure bivariate correlations between 
experiencing a referendum (post-referendum observation) and the indicators on 
perceptions of democracy. Since the analyses were cross-sectional the group 
coded as 0=not having experienced a referendum comprised respondents of other 
municipalities in the same year. Like earlier analyses, this test did not produce any 
statistically significant results. These statistics are reported in Appendix C. Thus, 
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 The “Political interest” variable reports coefficient and odds ratio for respondents of the year 
before while the “Political interest×Year after” is for political interest in the year after a 
referendum in reference to the year before. 
29
 The reason for defining high voter turnout as over 65 % is to have enough observations in the 
analyses which are not only confined to the referendums of the Stockholm municipalities (which 
had generally higher turnout). 
30
 With the exception of 2008, since no referendums took place in 2007 
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running analyses based on the same methods as previous research did not produce 
any significant correlations between the government-initiated referendums and 
citizens’ perceptions of democracy. Running further detailed analyses with other 
mediating variables or by setting the data up differently does not seem motivated.  
In conclusion, while the average odds for having favourable perceptions of 
democracy were higher in the year after a referendum, the regression analysis 
showed that this increase in favourable perceptions of democracy between the 
pre-referendum observation and the post-referendum observation were not 
significant. The exception was for satisfaction with local democracy. However, 
when controlling for political interest among the respondents, the change over 
time was no longer significant. Neither by modifying the analysis to fit better 
conditions (high turnout), nor by running purely cross-sectional analyses, 
produced any significant impact of the government-initiated referendums. The 
government-initiative hypothesis thus has to be rejected. 
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5 Discussion 
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the empirical test is that government-
initiated local referendums do not affect citizens’ perceptions of democracy. With 
no significant results, the government-initiative hypothesis thus needs to be 
rejected.  
With the empirical evidence telling us that the local referendums in Sweden 
do not have any impact on how citizens perceive their local democracy, we may 
still find the explanation in the theoretical arguments. Therefore, this extension of 
the analysis will be focused on two arguments in the theoretical section. The first 
is the relationship between citizens and representatives in a representative 
democracy model which includes referendums. This is one of the central aspects 
of both the theoretical section and the measures that were used. Following the 
controversies between representative and direct democracy regarding who should 
make decisions (elected elites or citizens themselves), it was suggested that 
although representatives still wants to enjoy their elevated position, citizens could 
be brought into a policy process though advisory voting. Such a strategy was 
thought to fix the problem of low participation and close the gap between elected 
and the electorate, but without implications that could disrupt the power of 
representatives.  
The second conclusion we can draw from the lack of confirming empirics is 
that if the theory on government-initiated referendums that is presented in this 
thesis is incorrect, that has consequences for hypotheses with higher demands on 
how referendums are thought to affect citizens. If bringing citizens into local 
decision making through local referendums in Sweden does not impact their 
opinions on representatives and local democracy, then how can the civic 
education-hypothesis or the referendum democracy concept for that matter, be 
viable in studying the same referendums? Although they might rest on different 
causal mechanisms or are conditional upon certain institutions, I will argue that 
these theories might need to be redefined as well.  
5.1 Representatives and citizens 
In the theoretical section it was argued that the referendum institute was 
introduced on the local level in Sweden in order to bridge an increasing gap 
between elected politicians and citizens. A comparative anthology (Schiller, 2011) 
on the topic revealed that similar reasons could be found in other European 
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countries. By holding referendums citizens could be brought into decision making 
by popular votes. However, by reducing the actual directness of the referendums 
(non-binding decisions, government initiation) the representatives could still 
remain in a favourable position of power. Still, the popular votes represent a 
foreign element in a policy process. The interaction between elected elites and 
citizens would therefore change accordingly to these new circumstances under 
which decisions were made. These expectations was in this theory developed from 
the academic literature on, mostly national, referendums, but also corresponds 
with the aims of Swedish policy (SOU 2000:1). A review of the literature on 
reasons for including a referendum device in national legislation revealed that the 
reasons where somewhat similar in other European countries. For example, 
Garkäjs (2011) notes that the Lithuanian policy on local referendums has the same 
focus on “complementing the representative government” that Sweden has had.  
Thus, giving local governments the possibility of holding referendums presents an 
opportunity of involvement of citizens in the political process, without imposing 
constraints on the authority of representatives. Since the positive effects on 
citizens that referendum democratic and direct democratic theory argued for relies 
on that citizens are the main actors in a referendum, we should expect less from 
government-initiated local referendums. If any, the effects would occur as 
specified by the reasoning for implementing them – to strengthen representative 
democracy and closing the gap between citizens and elected politicians. 
With the results from the survey data presented earlier the impact referendums 
may have on citizens is therefore questionable. Local governments giving citizens 
the possibility to influence a decision (of the government’s choice) through a vote 
(which is only advisory) does not seem to satisfy the demands of the theory. The 
self-government of citizens was either not experienced, or if citizens did 
experience it, it did not mean anything for the trust in their representatives. 
Government-initiated local referendums do not seem to have any impact that 
could bridge the gap between representatives and represented. Even if citizens 
appreciate the opportunity to influence policy, it did not produce any significant 
changes in perceptions of democracy between the pre-referendum observations 
and the post-referendum observations. Letting citizens influence a decision is not 
enough to ensure changes in perceptions of democracy. If the referendum institute 
is made available for local governments in order to increase the legitimacy of the 
representative democracy model then it is a device that has failed in achieving that 
goal. 
Although not an instrumental part of the theoretical argument, it could be 
argued that the local referendums of Sweden fail to produce any changes in 
citizens’ perceptions of democracy due to the fact that they are of low interest – 
voting on renaming your municipality may not have the same effect as when , for 
example, American states vote on the use of cannabis. However, when duplicating 
the regression but including only referendums with high voter turnout, this did not 
change the results. Thus, we can also conclude that low interest in the issues or 
policies voted on is not what explains the lack of positive effects. The absence of 
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positive effects remained also when switching the group of comparison from the 
same municipalities in an earlier year to pure cross-sectional control. This rejects 
the notion that the effects could be noticeable in comparison with other 
municipalities. 
Another observation is that we beforehand know that the perceptions of 
democracy in Sweden are fairly good – a majority of the Swedish citizens in fact 
perceive their local democracy to be good (SOM-institute, 2013: 40) and a fairly 
large number support their local government (ibid: 40). One might therefore 
question the relevance of including referendums in the decision making apparatus 
if the objective, at least in part, is to create an inflow of legitimacy and trust to the 
representative system. This could be compared to the results in Gilljam and 
Jodal’s (2006) study of local democracy projects, such as youth- and elderly 
councils. They deemed these projects as inadequate in vitalizing local politics and 
changing citizens’ attitudes towards local politics and democracy (ibid: 225-226). 
The projects were characterised by half-measure attempts and as such did not give 
any effects. In fact, they use the same measures as I am, but with fewer 
observations and a somewhat differing use of interaction-effects and panel data to 
study latent predictors of political participation and trust (ibid: 219, 223). In a 
blog-post on a Swedish political science blog Erlingsson further questioned the 
relevance of these local democracy projects by discussing if they were needed at 
all. Because of the already high support of local government his answer was “why 
fix something that is not broken?” (Politologerna 1).  
Both the local democracy projects discussed above and the local referendums 
analysed in this thesis aim at strengthening the representative democracy. While 
every governing party or politician may have other objectives (cf. De Vreese, 
2006; Breuer, 2009: 29-32) with a single referendum, the principal aim of making 
them available to local governments is complementing the representative system. 
And although referendums are special when compared to other democracy 
projects, the argument can apply to the Swedish usage of local referendums as 
well; an attempt at fixing something that is not broken. 
5.1.1 Who’s idea to vote? 
One of the key characteristics of the Swedish municipalities’ use of local 
referendums is that they are government initiated. This was also one of the 
reasons for studying the Swedish use of local referendums as a case. As stated in 
the theory section, this puts the relation between citizens and representatives as a 
priority. Previous empirical research (Morel, 2001, Rahat, 2009) tells us that the 
question of who is initiating a referendum often is more important than other 
variables (such as voter turnout or question wording) in explaining the effects of a 
referendum. This was also one of the reasons for analysing the effects of 
referendums with a modified version of referendum democracy. By tuning down 
the power of citizens and emphasising that referendums are used on terms set by 
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elites, it was believed that the desired outcomes of referendums should be in the 
elites favour. However, by taking the directness out of referendums, there is the 
possibility that referendums lose their purpose (that citizens decide upon policy) 
and thus also lose desired effects (such as trust in the representatives who initiated 
the referendum). While the theoretical argument presented in this thesis was 
formulated to account for this lack of directness, it seems that even a toned down 
version in favour of strengthening representative democracy was too optimistic. 
If citizens feel that through voting in a referendum they only partake in an 
expensive opinion poll, without being that influential, and if citizens already are 
satisfied with their local democracy and their representatives, then it is not strange 
that the results are absent of any positive effects. In a study similar to this thesis, 
Bowler & Donovan (2002) found that citizen attitudes towards state-level 
government in the U.S. were more favourable when referendums had been used. 
While government-initiated also gave effects, they show that citizen-initiated 
referendums had more impact on changes in citizen attitudes. Following their 
findings, the American case resembles the referendum democracy concept, 
whereas the Swedish case takes one step further away from the direct democratic 
elements of referendums, leaving citizens without the essential influence. In fact, 
the amount of control that elites exercise over citizens in the process of holding a 
referendum may be the weak link in the theory
31
. The invitation to participate 
simply is not enough to stimulate changing perceptions of democracy over time.  
This resembles Verba and Norman’s (1972) research on political participation, 
where instead of looking for quantity of participation, we should emphasise the 
quality of participation. Just putting “democracy tools” to use does not imply 
qualitative participation and ensuing positive effects on how citizens perceive 
government. It is conceivable that in order to close the gap between citizens and 
representatives, and to fix a participatory deficit, referendums are an accessible 
tool that is attributed with great effects on citizens. However, in taking the 
directness out of the referendum process (see figure 2.3.1) government-initiated 
referendums rob the direct democratic referendum of its causal mechanism: 
Through collective self-government that bypasses elites, citizens gain civic virtues 
and education such as increased political knowledge, tolerance and respect. By 
formulating my theoretical argument to instead be in favour of the elites, who 
initiates and decides upon the results of the referendums, I lessened the 
expectations on the Swedish local referendums. Still, with the results not being 
able to reject the null, nor confirm the argument on “invitation to participate in 
shaping policy” that I proposed, it is hard to argue in favour of the positive effects 
of government-initiated referendums. 
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 With the argument I presented in the theory section: By invitation from politicians, citizens 
would feel that they are listened to and are an active part in shaping policy, which would lead to 
more favourable perceptions of local democracy.  
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5.2 Referendums and direct democracy 
With the argument presented in this paper being incorrect, that has implications 
for other expectations on referendums. A recurring argument I have made in 
favour of the theory used here is that the expectations of the effects of 
referendums were modest in comparison to more optimistic views of what the use 
of referendums could mean. Here I would argue that if the local referendums of 
Sweden do not give any discernible effects on trust and legitimacy, then how 
could other theories of the effects of referendums, even when tested on 
government-initiated referendums in a more “hospitable environment32”, be valid?  
When comparing to the direct democratic society envisaged by Barber (2003) 
and Pateman (1970), with its popular self-government, the government-initiated 
local referendums of Sweden seem very far away. Having this in mind, we could 
look to the referendum democracy concept which was frequently discussed in the 
theory section. Mendelsohn and Parkin (2001) argued that as referendums have 
become an integrated part of representative government they have had an impact 
on the institutions of liberal democracy, including citizens (ibid). This was 
thought to increase the responsiveness of representatives and result in citizen 
empowerment. Also this empowerment of citizens was dismissed as being too far 
removed from the government-initiated referendums, due to the amount of control 
elites can exercise in framing the question put on the ballot. 
When the results in this thesis then deem the government-initiative hypothesis 
as incorrect, the expectations set by the referendum democratic and direct 
democratic theory with regards to citizens, also fail. The argument here is simple. 
If government-initiated local referendums do not produce an increase in 
favourable perceptions of democracy, they can hardly produce any greater 
outcomes – especially since self-government and empowerment of citizens rely on 
bypassing elites. Since the hypothesis presented in this thesis was adapted to the 
specifics of government-initiated referendums and was more modest in its 
expectations, then neither direct democratic nor referendum democratic theory can 
be more successful in predicting changes in perceptions of democracy. 
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 Such as a polity with frequent use of government-initiated referendum, or with access to more 
direct democratic referendums (such as citizen initiatives or mandatory constitutional 
referendums). 
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5.3 Concluding remarks 
The theoretical discussion in this thesis started with the observation that 
referendums often are envisaged as efforts in civic education, and ended with the 
rejection of a more modest hypothesis, which expected that citizens might display 
more favourable perceptions of democracy after experiencing a government-
initiated referendum. Although this attempt at conceptualising referendums in 
representative democracy did not succeed, future research needs to continue 
producing theory and testable hypotheses beyond the ideal types of direct 
democracy and representative democracy. Especially a continued effort to 
empirically study government-initiated referendums is needed to assess the 
theoretical claims made by several different democracy traditions.  
Swedish national government strengthened the citizen-initiative in 2010. 
When local governments could no longer block petitions to the extent they have 
done before, several citizen-initiatives were successful in being put on the ballot. 
However, since the votes are still advisory, this has led to that local government 
more often disregards the results of such votes. Studying Swedish local 
referendums in the future promises to be as intriguing as the years 2002-2011 
were. 
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7 Appendix  
7.1 Appendix A – referendums and frequencies 
      Table A1: Local referendums included in the analyses 
Year Municipality Topic 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Turnout 
% 
 
2011 Ängelholm New traffic route - - -  
2010 Kinda Sale of Villa Björksund - - -  
2010 Lidköping 
Placement of the city 
library 
- - -  
2009 Avesta Placement of train station - - -  
2009 Borgholm Öland – one municipality - - -  
2009 Mörbylånga Öland- one municipality - - -  
2008 Vilhelmina Hydropower line 46 52 74,5  
2008 Huddinge Partition of municipality 40 58,8 52,6  
2006 Österåker Congestion charges 40,9 59,1 74,9  
2006 Vaxholm Congestion charges 45,9 54,1 80,2  
2006 Täby Congestion charges 34,2 65,8 78,6  
2006 Tyresö Congestion charges 44,3 55,7 77,7  
2006 Stockholm Congestion charges 53 47 76,4  
2006 Solna Congestion charges 43,9 56,1 74  
2006 Sollentuna Congestion charges 40,8 59,2 72,7  
2006 Salem Congestion charges 39,6 60,4 76  
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Table A1 continued      
2006 Nynäshamn Congestion charges 41,2 58,8 78,7  
2006 Nacka Congestion charges 42,9 57,1 78,1  
2006 Lidingö Congestion charges 29,6 70,4 78,7  
2006 Haninge Congestion charges 40,8 59,2 69  
2006 Ekerö Congestion charges 32,5 67,5 81,6  
2006 Danderyd Congestion charges 32,5 67,5 81,6  
2006 Älvdalen Hunting of wolf 87,7 12,3 65,6  
2006 Rättvik Hunting of wolf 72,7 27,3 62,8  
2006 Orsa Hunting of wolf 81,7 18,3 68,1  
2006 Mora Hunting of wolf 77,3 22,7 60,4  
2006 Härnösand New shopping centre 43,5 56,5 60  
2006 Gällivare Car-free town centre 50,4 49,6 66  
2006 Eskilstuna Partition of municipality 21,7 78,3 53  
2005 Öckerö Ferry or bridge 34 65 55  
2005 Kalix New school plan 11 89 34  
2004 Kungälv Keeping music school 77 21 45,5  
2004 Värmdö Project for young people 78 22 37,6  
2004 Värmdö Congestion charges 22 78 37,7  
2004 Partille New road 39 61 44  
2004 Norrköping 
Keeping emergency 
hospital 
96 4 49  
2004 Bräcke 
Merging of Bräcke and 
Ragunda 
35 64,5 43,5  
2004 Ragunda 
Merging of Bräcke and 
Ragunda 
19,5 77,5 48,5  
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Table A1 continued      
2003 Norsjö Water protection project 31 69 65  
2003 Södertälje New bridge over “Maren” 40,4 55,7 67,2  
2003 Örkelljunga Fees in child care 61,1 25,8 57,4  
2003 Österåker Congestion charges 14,3 82,1 73,4  
2003 Vaxholm Congestion charges 19,4 76 72,8  
2003 Täby Congestion charges 14,5 82,1 78,2  
2003 Tyresö Congestion charges 14,7 81,8 75,6  
2003 Sollentuna Congestion charges 16,1 79,5 73,2  
2003 Solna Congestion charges 19 77,1 68  
2003 Salem Congestion charges 13,6 83,4 73,5  
2003 Nykvarn Congestion charges 12,9 81,4 76,8  
2003 Nacka Congestion charges 16,3 80,9 73  
2003 Lidingö Congestion charges 7,8 90,4 77,6  
2003 Ekerö Congestion charges 16,3 79,8 78,7  
2003 Danderyd Congestion charges 15,7 81 72,9  
2003 Luleå Local road use 
Only 
buses 
24,8 
Cars & 
buses 
68,4 
46,1  
2002 Uppvidinge Child care project 51,6 39,9 51,4  
2002 Skurup Off-shore wind farm 49 51 -  
2002 Orust 
New connection to 
mainland 
Bridge 
33,9 
Tunnel 
34,6 
42,7  
2002 Ljusnarsberg New name <50 >50 -  
2002 Karlstad Child care project 68,2 22,5 33  
2002 Håbo New name 27,7 69,7 68,6  
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Table A1 continued      
2002 Haparanda Urban planning project 46,2 52,3 52  
2002 Haninge Public housing 52,9 47,1 60,5  
2002 Essunga New name 51,4 47,6 75,8  
Notes: Results, voter turnout and English translation for the years 2002-2008 is 
collected from Kaufmann (2011: 265-267). Average turnout 64,649 %. Topics are 
from Kaufmann (ibid) the Election Authority (Election Authority 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Year before a 
referendum 
 
Year after a 
referendum 
2002 323  - 
2003 84  92 
2004 8  260 
2005 538  98 
2006 -  12 
2007 30  536 
2008 16  - 
2009 44  49 
2010 12  35 
2011 -  26 
2012 -  31 
Total 1055  1139 
Table A2: Frequencies of respondents 
identified in pre-referendum and post-
referendum observations 
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7.2 Appendix B – Odds and regression 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B1: Percentages and odds for having favourable perceptions of democracy 
for respondents grouped by year of referendum. 
 
Satisfaction with local democracy 
One year before a referendum   One year after a referendum 
Year 
Percentage 
(n) 
Odds Year 
Percentage 
(n) 
Odds 
2002 
56,3 
(160) 
1,2883 
2003 
53,5 
(86) 
1,1505 
2004 
53,4 
(247) 
1,1459 
2003 
46,9 
(81) 
0,8832 2005 
47,9 
(94) 
0,9194 
2004 
57,1 
(7) 
1,331 2006 
75 
(12) 
3 
2005 
55,6 
(513) 
1,2523 2007 
68,3 
(517) 
2,1546 
2006 - - 2008 - - 
2007 
63,3 
(30) 
1,7248 2009 
68,8 
(48) 
2,2051 
2008 
60 
(15) 
1,5 2010 
85,3 
(34) 
5,8027 
2009 
66,7 
(21) 
2,003 2011 
69,2 
(26) 
2,2468 
2010 
58,3 
(12) 
1,3981 2012 
60,7 
(28) 
1,5445 
 (839) 
Mean 
1,4226 
 
 
(1092) 
 
Mean 
2,2411 
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Table B1 continued 
 
Trust in respondents municipal board 
 One year before a referendum   One year after a referendum 
Year 
Percentage 
(n) 
Odds Year 
Percentage 
(n) 
Odds 
2002 
40,1 
(142) 
0,6694 
2003 
41,5 
(41) 
0,7094 
2004 
38,1 
(113) 
0,6155 
2003 
22,2 
(36) 
0,2853 2005 
32,7 
(52) 
0,4859 
2004 
0 
(3) 
0 2006 
20 
(5) 
0,25 
2005 
33 
(215) 
0,4925 2007 
38 
(421) 
0,6129 
 (396) 
Mean 
0,3618 
 (632) 
Mean 
0,5347 
 Trust in municipal boards generally 
 One year before a referendum   One year after a referendum 
Year 
Percentage 
(n) 
Odds Year 
Percentage 
(n) 
Odds 
2002 
21 
(309) 
0,2658 
2003 
27,1 
(85) 
0,3717 
2004 
19,4 
(248) 
0,2407 
2003 
13,4 
(82) 
0,1547 2005 
20,2 
(94) 
0,2531 
2004 
0 
(6) 
0 2006 
45,5 
(11) 
0,8349 
2005 
15,6 
(507) 
0,1848 2007 
19,3 
(512) 
0,2392 
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Table B1 continued 
2006 - - 2008 - - 
2007 
34,5 
(29) 
0,5267 2009 
14,3 
(35) 
0,1669 
2008 
13,3 
(15) 
0,1534 2010 
38,2 
(34) 
0,6181 
2009 
41,2 
(34) 
0,7007 2011 
16 
(25) 
0,1905 
2010 
33,3 
(12) 
0,4993 2012 
13,3 
(30) 
0,1534 
 
(994) 
 
Mean 
0,3107 
 (1074) 
Mean 
0,3409 
Notes: Table displays percentages of respondents who have favourable perceptions 
of democracy, and the odds for having favourable perceptions of democracy. The 
mean values are also reported in table 4.1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B2: Logistic regression including only referendums with high turnout 
 
Trust in respondents 
municipal board† 
 
Trust in municipal boards 
generally 
 β 
Odds 
ratio 
S.E 
 
β 
Odds 
ratio 
S:E. 
Year after 
dummy 
,127 1,135 ,153 ,255 1,190 ,139 
Constant 
-
,551** 
,576 ,122 -1,629 ,196 ,103 
Pseudo R
2
 
(Nagelkerke) 
,001 ,004 
n 773 1391 
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7.3 Appendix C - Cross-sectional analysis 
Correlation matrices displaying cross-sectional correlation coefficients between 
those who experienced a referendum and the dependent variables are presented 
below. This (non-parametric) correlation coefficient displays a result ranging from 
-1 to 1. The Tau coefficient measures if paired observations vary together. 
Experiencing referendums is not significantly correlated with any of the indicators 
on perceptions of democracy. This result does not change between the different 
pooled cross-sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B2 
continued 
Satisfaction with local 
democracy 1 
 
Satisfaction with local 
democracy 2 
 β 
Odds 
ratio 
S.E.  β 
Odds 
ratio 
S.E. 
Year after 
dummy 
,301* 1,351 ,115 
 
,717 2,049 ,417 
Political 
interest 
   ,074 1,077 ,105 
Political 
interest × Year 
after dummy 
   -,162 ,851 ,146 
Constant ,232* 1,261 ,084 ,045 1,046 ,297 
Pseudo R
2
 
(Nagelkerke) 
,007  ,007 
n 1283  1269 
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Table C1: Cross-sectional analyses of the effects of referendums. Years 2003, 2004, 2005 – 
Correlation matrix. Kendall’s tau-b. (n in parentheses) 
  
Experienced a 
referendum 
Trust in 
respondents 
municipal board 
Trust in 
municipal 
boards 
generally 
Satisfaction 
with local 
democracy 
Experienced a 
referendum 
 1    
Trust in respondents’ 
municipal board 
 
,027 
(4492) 
1   
Trust in municipal 
boards generally 
 
,016 
(10185) 
,418** 
(4336) 
1  
Satisfaction with local 
democracy 
 
-,002 
(10235) 
,223** 
(4331) 
,217** 
(9958) 
1 
Notes:  
** indicates significance at p<,001 
Table C2: Cross-sectional analyses of the effects of referendums. Years 2006, 2007, 2009 
– Correlation matrix. Kendall’s tau-b. (n in parentheses) 
  
Experienced a 
referendum 
Trust in 
municipal boards 
generally 
Satisfaction with 
local democracy 
Experienced a 
referendum 
 1   
Trust in municipal 
boards generally 
 
-,016 
(9548) 
1  
Satisfaction with local 
democracy 
 
,025 
(11205) 
,210** 
(9364) 
1 
Notes: Trust in respondents’ municipal board is reported in table B3 since it is not measured after 
2008.  
** indicates significance at p<,001 
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Table C3: Cross-sectional analysis of the effects of referendums. Years 2006, 
2007  – Correlation matrix. Kendall’s tau-b. (n in parentheses) 
  
Experienced a 
referendum 
Trust in 
respondents’ 
municipal board 
Experienced a referendum  1  
Trust in respondents’ 
municipal board 
 
-,011 
(4206) 
1 
Notes: Since trust in respondents’ municipal board is not available for the year 2009 it 
is here reported by itself.  
** indicates significance at p<,001 
Table C4: Cross-sectional analyses of the effects of referendums. Years 2010, 2011, 2012 
– Correlation matrix. Kendall’s tau-b. (n in parentheses) 
  
Experienced a 
referendum 
Trust in 
municipal boards 
generally 
Satisfaction with 
local democracy 
Experienced a 
referendum 
 1   
Trust in municipal 
boards generally 
 
-,001 
(15204) 
1  
Satisfaction with local 
democracy 
 
,007 
(15252) 
,274** 
(14885) 
1 
Notes: 
** indicates significance at p<,001 
